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ABSTRACT 
 
Effects of Federal Risk Management Programs on Investment, Production, and Contract 
Design under Uncertainty. (December 2004) 
Sangtaek Seo, B.Econ., Chungbuk National University; 
M.Econ., Korea University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David J. Leatham 
 
 
Agricultural producers face uncertain agricultural production and market 
conditions.  Much of the uncertainty faced by agricultural producers cannot be controlled 
by the producer, but can be managed.  Several risk management programs are available 
in the U.S. to help manage uncertainties in agricultural production, marketing, and 
finance.  This study focuses on the farm level economic implications of the federal risk 
management programs.  In particular, the effects of the federal risk management 
programs on investment, production, and contract design are investigated. 
The dissertation is comprised of three essays.  The unifying theme of these 
essays is the economic analysis of crop insurance programs.  The first essay examines 
the effects of revenue insurance on the entry and exit thresholds of table grape producers 
using a real option approach.  The results show that revenue insurance decreases the 
entry and exit thresholds compared with no revenue insurance, thus increasing the 
investment and current farming operation.  If the policy goal is to induce more farmers 
 iv 
in grape farming, the insurance policy with a high coverage level and high subsidy rate 
is effective. 
In the second essay, a mathematical programming model is used to examine the 
effects of federal risk management programs on optimal nitrogen fertilizer use and land 
allocation simultaneously.  Current insurance programs and the Marketing Loan 
Program increase the optimal fertilizer rate 2% and increase the optimal cotton acreage 
119-130% in a Texas cotton-sorghum system.  Assuming nitrogen is harmful to the 
environment and cotton requires higher nitrogen use, these risk management programs 
counteract federal environmental programs.   
The third essay uses a principal-agent model to examine the optimal contract 
design that induces the best effort from the farmer when crop insurance is purchased.  
With the introduction of crop insurance, the investor’s optimal equity financing contract 
requires that the farmer bear more risk in order to have the incentive to work hard, which 
is achieved by increasing variable compensation and decreasing fixed compensation. 
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CHAPTER I   
INTRODUCTION 
 
Agricultural producers face uncertain agricultural production and market 
conditions.  Yield and price fluctuations largely define this uncertainty.  Yield 
uncertainty is mainly caused by weather.  Price uncertainty arises from the interaction of 
supply and demand conditions ultimately involving many underlying international and 
domestic factors, including weather.  This uncertainty makes agricultural income 
unstable.  Much of the uncertainty faced by agricultural producers cannot be controlled 
by the producer but can be managed.  Thus risk management is important to farmers and 
agricultural policy makers. 
Several risk management approaches are available in the U.S. to help manage 
uncertainties in agricultural production, marketing, and finance.  Two widely adopted 
risk management programs are the crop insurance and marketing loan programs 
provided by the federal government.  These programs protect income and market prices 
in the face of uncertain production and market conditions.   
Yield insurance and revenue insurance are the most commonly used among the 
crop insurance programs.  Yield insurance guarantees a minimum level of yield 
(however, the indemnity is given in terms of monetary value) and revenue insurance 
guarantees a minimum level of revenue.  The Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) 
of 2000 resulted in increased premium subsidies from the government and an expansion 
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in the types of policies available, the crops covered, and the geographic availability.  
Total acres covered by crop insurance increased from 182 million in 1998 to 216 million 
in 2002 with total liability, a maximum indemnity that should be paid in case of total 
loss, increasing from $28 billion to $37 billion (USDA-RMA 2002a).   
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 continued the nonrecourse 
marketing assistance loan program and loan deficiency program (LDP) that guarantees 
the minimum level of selected commodity prices, called the marketing loan rate.  The 
former provides a marketing assistance loan to meet cash flow needs of farmers at 
harvest time by requiring commodities as collateral.  This loan is non-recourse because 
the farmer can repay the loan with principal plus interest or forfeit the commodity to the 
government.   The LDP is defined as the difference between the marketing loan rate and 
the posted county price (PCP) provided by the government at harvest time.  If the PCP 
falls below the marketing loan rate at harvest time, then the farmer benefits from the 
LDP.  Unlike crop insurance, those programs do not require the payment of a premium 
for participation.  Marketing loan gain and the magnitude of LDP payments exceeded $1 
billion and $6 billion for the 2000 crop year (USDA-FSA 2002a), respectively.   
Risk management programs reduce downside risk faced by the farmer.  Such 
provisions affect crop returns and thus farm investment and production decisions as well 
as leasing contracts.  Those programs may induce farmers to grow crops that use more 
nitrogen, herbicides, and insecticides with possible detrimental effects on the 
environment (Goodwin and Smith; Skees).  Crop insurance may encourage or 
discourage investment in perennial crops and may lead existing farmers to stay in 
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farming longer or leave earlier.  Crop insurance may alter agricultural contracts.  The 
impacts that these decisions have need to be considered by policy makers and farm 
decision makers. 
This study focuses on the farm level economic implications of federal risk 
management programs.  Specifically, the work will focus on crop insurance and the 
marketing loan program that are used to protect farmers from yield, income, and price 
uncertainties.  In particular, the effects of federal risk management programs on the 
investment, production, and contract design will be investigated. 
The dissertation will be comprised of three essays.  The sections that follow 
include a description of the three essays, each with its own purpose and procedure.  The 
unifying theme of these essays is the economic analysis of crop insurance programs.  
Collectively through the three studies we will examine how the presence of crop 
insurance and LDP provisions changes farm decisions regarding investment in risky 
assets, choice of crops and input uses, and contract provisions between investors and 
farmers.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
EFFECT OF REVENUE INSURANCE ON ENTRY AND EXIT DECISIONS IN 
TABLE GRAPE PRODUCTION: A REAL OPTION APPROACH 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The passage of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) in 2000 greatly 
expanded the availability of crop insurance to farmers.  Not only have premium 
subsidies increased, but also the types of policies available and the crops that can be 
insured.  As a result, total acres covered by crop insurance increased from 182 million in 
1998 to 216 million in 2002 (USDA-RMA 2002a).  By buying crop insurance, farmers 
reduce the risk that they face in exchange for some premiums.  This behavior changes 
the expected future cash flow and its distribution and thus affects the investment or 
disinvestments decisions.  Also, increased subsidies affect those decisions through the 
change in the expected cash flow and its distribution.  Thus, the effect of crop insurance 
on the investment and disinvestments decision needs to be investigated for policy 
makers and farmers so that they make better decision-making.  However, the effect of 
crop insurance on the investment and disinvestments decisions has not been studied yet.   
Many investment studies in agricultural literature have focused on the land 
valuation (Robison, Hanson, and Lins), asset replacement decision (Leatham and Baker; 
Perrin), and facility purchase (Griffin et al.) using the net present value (NPV) approach.  
Some studies include the effect of the government tax policy on the agricultural 
investment decision using the NPV (Musser, Tew, and Clifton; Rossi).  Musser, Tew, 
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and Clifton studied the tax benefit of the investment in irrigation equipment and Rossi 
studied the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on feeding investments using NPV.  
Also Baker, Leatham, and Schrader studied the effect of inflation on a confinement 
swine operation.  However, no studies include crop insurance in the investment analysis 
using the NPV.   
The decision rule of NPV requires that the NPV be nonnegative for the 
investment to be acceptable and then choose the highest NPV among different scenarios.  
These decisions are made at current time and the opportunity cost from the loss of future 
possible investments is not reflected in the NPV.  That is, the NPV ignores the 
investment timing (called the investment flexibility).  The investment flexibility is 
valuable because, by adjusting investment timing, the investor may possibly avoid 
investing in projects that results in large sunk costs if there are subsequent unfavorable 
market conditions.  Thus, the NPV approach has been criticized because it only 
considers the current decision, not the investment flexibility to invest at later date (Myer). 
As an alternative to NPV, the concept of real options has been used to overcome 
the shortcomings of standard NPV (Trigeorgis).  Dixit (1991) analyzed the effect of 
price ceiling and price floor on the investment decision using a real option approach.  
This study incorporates the investment flexibility and investment timing. The investment 
criterion is a trigger value that specifies when to enter the business (called entry 
threshold).  An investor currently in business must also make the decision to continue 
operating or exit the business.  In this case, the trigger value to exit the business (called 
exit threshold) is given as a disinvestment decision criterion.  This approach applies the 
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financial option concept to the investment in real assets when the decision is made under 
uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck; Trigeorgis).  That is, this approach regards the 
investment flexibility in real assets as an option to undertake an investment over a given 
period.  This is similar to an American option in which the holder of the option can 
exercise the option at any point of time from when the option is purchased.   
Recent real option studies in the agricultural economics literature include the 
entry-exit decision (Price and Wetzstein; Isik et al., 2003), the equipment replacement 
decision (Hyde, Stokes, and Engel), the sequential investment decision in crop 
management (Isik, Khanna, and Winter-Nelson), and technology adoption (Purvis et al.).  
Salin studied the impact of food safety risks on capital investment.  However, no studies 
use the real option approach to consider the effect of crop insurance on the investment 
decision.  This study incorporates crop insurance into real option model to see the effect 
of crop insurance on investment decision. 
Specifically, the purpose of this study is to set up a real option model with crop 
insurance and investigate the effect that crop insurance has on the entry threshold as an 
investment criterion and exit threshold as a disinvestment criterion.  For the application, 
we choose table grape production in California that accounts for 90% of domestic grape 
production (USDA-ERS).  Currently, only yield insurance is available for table grapes as 
a crop specific insurance in California.  However, adjusted gross revenue (AGR) and the 
recently developed AGR-Lite provides revenue insurance as whole farm insurances that 
include several crops in several states such as California, Oregon, and Florida (USDA-
RMA 2003).  There is a high potential to introduce revenue insurance for table grapes as 
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a crop specific insurance in other states including California according to the ARPA in 
2000.  Thus revenue insurance also is considered in this study.   
It is expected that using the real option approach to evaluate the effect of crop 
insurance on investment decisions will contribute to the investment literature.  This 
study also will include the effects of crop insurance on investment decision, such as the 
effect of minimum level of revenue guarantee or subsidy effect on investment decisions.  
In addition, the results of this study will be useful to other potential regions, such as 
southern Arizona, northern New Mexico, and Texas that may grow table grapes (Stein 
and McEachern).   
In the following section, we intuitively explain the entry and exit thresholds for 
standard NPV and real option approaches.  Then the actual model, data, and results 
follow. 
 
2.2. Entry and Exit Thresholds for Standard NPV and Real Options 
Entry and exit thresholds are part of the decision criterion when using the real 
option method.  The entry and exit thresholds can be different when the NPV is used 
instead of real options.  This section illustrates these differences.  To make the 
comparison easier, we assume a totally irreversible investment that produces no salvage 
value.  The inclusion of the salvage value complicates the model derivation without 
adding anything to the comparison.  This assumption is relaxed in the section 2.3 so that 
the effect of the salvage value on investment decision is explored using the real option 
approach.   
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2.2.1. Entry and Exit Thresholds with Standard NPV 
The NPV is defined as the discounted value of the difference between future 
revenue flow Rt and future cost flow Ct minus initial investment cost (sunk cost) I0.  
With finite time horizon and discrete time notation, standard NPV can be denoted as 
(2.1)    0
0 (1 ) (1 )
T
t t
t t
t
R CNPV I
ρ ρ
=
 
= − − + + 
 , 
where ρ is the risk adjusted rate that consists of the risk free rate and the risk premium 
rate and T is the number of years of the project’s life.   It requires a non-negative NPV at 
t=0 for the investment to be acceptable.   
To maintain the consistency with the real option approach, the investment is 
assumed to be perpetual, and R and C are constant through time.  In addition, the risk 
free rate, r, is chosen to discount the relatively stable cost C.  By assuming a rate of 
growth or drift (trend) rate α in revenue, the NPV is 
(2.2)    R CNPV I
rδ= − − , 
where δ is the risk and growth adjusted discount rate that is ρ minus the drift rate α, such 
that δ  = ρ - α (Dixit and Pindyck).  This adjustment is justified when the revenue flow 
has a constant-growth rate (trend) because it prevents underestimating the true revenue 
flow.  The use of continuous time analytics is helpful to make the transition from the 
standard NPV decision criterion to the revised decision criterion for investments under 
real options.  The first step is to consider the decision criterion, the entry threshold, to 
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answer the question of “when” to invest, not simply invest or not invest that is inherent 
in the NPV criterion.  In equation (2.2), the entry threshold is denoted as RH and is 
defined as the level of revenue flow R that makes the NPV zero and thus guarantees at 
least no loss from investment.  The entry threshold provides a trigger value such that a 
decision maker invests when R is at least as high as RH.   Thus the entry threshold RH is 
denoted as  
(2.3)    H
CR I
r
δ δ= + ,  
where the right hand side of equation (2.3) is the long-run average cost.  The decision 
rule of equation (2.3) is to enter the business if the revenue flow is equal to or greater 
than the entry threshold RH and not to enter the business otherwise. 
After the investor enters the business, the investor must decide when to disinvest.  
The investor must consider the loss of revenue that is incurred from disinvestment, the 
savings in costs, and the exit cost E.  Thus, the NPV in equation (2.2) can be altered to 
reflect the decision to disinvest and is written as 
(2.4)    R CNPV E
rδ= − + − . 
In equation (2.4), the exit threshold denoting RL, the trigger value to disinvest, is defined 
as the level of revenue flow R that makes the NPV zero and thus guarantees at least no 
loss from disinvestments.  Thus, the exit threshold RL is denoted as  
(2.5)    L
CR E
r
δ δ= − . 
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The decision rule of equation (2.5) is to exit the business if revenue flow is less 
than the trigger value RL and to stay in business otherwise.  The entry and exit thresholds 
with the real options are compared with those with the NPV approach in the following 
section.   
 
2.2.2. Entry and Exit Thresholds with Real Options 
In this section, intuitive explanations of the real option approach are provided.  
The differences between the entry and exit thresholds using NPV and the real option 
approach are presented for the intuitive understanding. 
To determine the entry threshold with real options, we assume that the farmer has 
an exclusive right to invest so that the revenue movement is not restricted from 
competition.  This assumption makes the model derivation easier but this assumption is 
relaxed later and a competitive market is modeled.  Also the disinvestment (exit) 
decision is not considered for the entry threshold decision here because it requires 
simultaneous decision making with entry decision and this makes the comparison with 
standard NPV difficult.   
An inactive farmer is a farmer who is currently not farming but can potentially 
invest in a farming operation.  If an inactive farmer gets in farming production, he must 
buy land and machinery.  While the farmer is inactive, he has an option to invest and this 
option has a value, V0(R).  The value of this option results because of the uncertainty and 
irreversibility of the investment.  By waiting, the inactive farmer gains more information 
and can avoid investing if later the investment turns out to be unprofitable.  If an inactive 
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farmer enters farming by exercising an option to invest, he/she looses the option to 
invest and instead becomes an active farmer who is currently engaged in farming.  That 
is, by entering farming, an inactive farmer gets a value of V1(R) with the expense of the 
investment cost I and becomes an active farmer.  The entry decision is made when the 
V1(R) – I is at least greater than or equal to V0(R), where the entry threshold to exactly 
meet this condition is denoted by RH.  Intuitively, the value of V1(R) – I represents the 
NPV but the value of the option to invest V0(R) is unique in the real options approach.     
For the mathematical comparison with NPV, denote V1(R) as the value of an 
active (current) farm, V0(R) the value of an inactive (potential) farm that is called the 
value of waiting or the value of the option to invest, I as the investment cost, and R is the 
revenue flow with a Brownian Motion process.1  Then the value of waiting V0(R) is 
defined as  
(2.6)     10 1( )V R A Rβ= , 
where A1 > 0 and β1 > 1 and A1 is the constant to be determined, and β1 is the positive 
root of the fundamental quadratic equation (The derivation of this formula is obtained in 
the equation (A.22) through (A.24) of the appendix A).  The option value of waiting 
V0(R) is nonnegative because the farmer can avoid the bad state of nature by waiting.  
This value is also an increasing function of revenue flow R because the option to invest 
works as the American call option, where the call option value increases with the market 
price of the underlying asset.  
                                                 
1
 The origins of Brownian motion processes are in physics, specifically the characteristics of a heavy 
particle being bombarded by lighter particles (Salin). 
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The value of an active farm V1(R) is assumed as the same as the standard NPV 
without investment cost from equation (2.2) for the comparison purpose.  A more 
specific derivation of the value of an active farm is obtained from Appendix A.  Then the 
value of an active farm V1(R) is defined as  
(2.7)     1( )
R CV R
rδ= − , 
where δ and r are defined in section 2.2.1. 
The two value functions V0(R) and V1(R), are graphed in the figure 2.1 (Dixit 
1992) to examine the investment (entry) decision with the real option approach.  In the 
graph, the vertical axe V denotes the project value and – I denotes the initial investment 
cost.  The horizon axe denotes revenue flow R. 
 
Project value 
          (V)                                                          
                               The value of an inactive  
                                     farm [ 0 ( )V R ]                       The value of an active 
                                                                      farm [V1(R) – I]  
 
          0                         R0              R1                   Revenue flow (R) 
 
Investment  
cost (- I) 
 
Figure 2.1. Entry thresholds with real options and standard NPV  
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In the figure 2.1, the R0 and R1 are the entry thresholds with standard NPV and 
the real option approaches, respectively, and V0(R) and V1(R) – I are the value of an 
inactive farm and the value of an active farm net of investment cost (sunk cost), 
respectively.  As mentioned, standard NPV requires a non-negative project value as the 
investment rule so that the entry threshold hits the zero project value at R0 (see equation 
(2.3)).  On the other hand, the real option approach requires two conditions, value 
matching condition and smooth pasting condition, for the investment criterion.  Value 
matching condition is a condition that the value of an active farm is equal to the value of 
an inactive farm.  That is, it requires an entry threshold RH that makes the value of an 
inactive farm (potential farm) V0(R) equal the value of an active farm V1(R) when an 
inactive farm spends the investment cost I and in return gets a project value V1(R).  
Smooth pasting condition is a tangency condition that requires the marginal value of an 
inactive farm is equal to the marginal value of an active farm.  That is, it requires that, at 
the entry threshold RH, the slopes of the value of an inactive farm and the value of an 
active farm net of the investment cost be the same.  In the figure 2.1, the restriction of 
smooth pasting condition pushes the curve of V0(R) above that of V1(R) and makes a 
tangency point by adjusting unknown A1.  This tangency point determines the entry 
threshold that makes the marginal value of inactive farm equal to the marginal value of 
an active farmer.   
In the figure 2.1, the entry threshold R1 meets those conditions.  If revenue flow 
R is less than the entry threshold R1, then the value of an inactive farm V0(R), called the 
value of waiting, is greater than the value of an active farm V1(R) net of investment cost 
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I and thus waiting is the better policy.  If revenue flow R exceeds at least the entry 
threshold R1, then exercising the investment option by spending investment cost I and 
getting a project is the better policy.  At this time, by exercising the investment option 
and getting a project, the farmer loses the option value of waiting.    
The real option approach requires higher entry threshold than standard NPV by 
the difference between R1 and R0.  The difference of entry thresholds between the two 
approaches is caused by the option value of waiting.  The real option approach captures 
the value of waiting, while the NPV does not.  In reality, business decision-making 
should consider operating flexibility and thus requires higher investment threshold than 
the NPV (Donaldson and Lorsch).  If the option value of waiting is zero, then the real 
option approach produces the same entry threshold R0 as standard NPV. 
Mathematically, the value matching condition and the smooth pasting condition 
for the entry decision are represented as 
(2.8)    V0(RH) = V1(RH) – I, 
(2.9)    ' '0 1( ) ( )H HV R V R= .  
Equation (2.8) and (2.9) can be solved for RH from equation (2.6) and (2.7), 
where A1 and RH are unknowns to be determined.  To get the solution for RH, first 
replace equation (2.8) and (2.9) with equation (2.6) and (2.7).  Then divide equation 
(2.8) by equation (2.9) and then rearrange for RH.  The solution for the entry threshold is  
(2.10)    1
1 1
H
CR I
r
β δ δβ
 
= + 
−  
, 
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where β1/(β1-1) is greater than 1 because β1 > 1.  Equation (2.10) shows that the entry 
threshold with real options is greater than the entry threshold with standard NPV in 
equation (2.3) by a factor of β1/(β1-1). 
Second, the exit threshold in a real option approach can be easily derived and 
compared with the exit threshold in standard NPV when we follow the same procedure 
explained in the entry threshold with real options.  All the definitions and terms used for 
the entry threshold both in NPV and real options and used for the exit threshold in NPV 
are used for the exit threshold in real options.  The exclusive right to exit and no 
investment (entry) decision are assumed with the same reasons as in the entry threshold. 
An active farmer can exit the farming when he/she expects unfavorable market or 
production conditions.  The exit decision can be done any time in the future depending 
on the state of nature.  Thus, the exit decision at the current time creates an opportunity 
cost by losing the future opportunity for the decision-making and this is referred to as the 
option value to exit.  The Real options approach can capture this disinvestment (exit) 
flexibility as the option value to exit.  This option value increases the project value and 
thus decreases the exit threshold compared with NPV.  For the understanding of the exit 
threshold in real options, we simply present the mathematical comparison between the 
NPV and real options approaches. 
Given the assumptions and definitions above, the value function for an inactive 
farm V0(R) is zero and the value function of an active farm V1(R) is defined as  
(2.11)     21 2( )
R CV R B R
r
β
δ= + − , 
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where B2 > 0 and β2 < 0 and B2 is the constant to be determined, β2 is the negative root 
of the fundamental quadratic equation (The derivation of this formula is obtained in the 
equation (A.22) through (A.24) of the appendix A), and 22B Rβ  is the option value to exit.  
The option value to exit 22B R
β
 
is nonnegative because the farmer can exit the farming 
whenever the bad state of nature is expected in the future.  Thus as the possibility of the 
bad state of nature increases, the option value to exit increases, too.  This value is also a 
decreasing function of revenue flow R because the possibility to exit the farming 
decreases as revenue flow increases. 
To get the exit threshold in real option, value matching condition and smooth 
pasting conditions are required as in the entry threshold.  Value matching condition is a 
condition that the value of an active farm is equal to the value of an inactive farm.  That 
is, it requires an exit threshold RL that makes the value of an active farm V1(R) equal the 
value of an inactive farm V0(R) when an active farm spends the exit cost E and in return 
gets the option value to invest V0(R).  Smooth pasting condition is a tangency condition 
that the marginal value of an active farm is equal to the marginal value of an inactive 
farm.  That is, it requires that, at the exit threshold RL, the slopes of the value of an active 
farm and the value of an inactive farm net of the exit cost be the same.   
Mathematically, the value matching condition and the smooth pasting condition 
for the exit decision are represented as 
(2.12)    V1(RL) = V0(RL) – E, 
(2.13)    ' '1 0( ) ( )L LV R V R= .  
 17 
Equation (2.12) and (2.13) can be solved for RL from equation (2.11) and V0(R) = 0, 
where B2 and RL are unknowns to be determined.  To get the solution for RH, first replace 
equation (2.12) and (2.13) with equation (2.11) and V0(R) = 0.  Then divide equation 
(2.12) by equation (2.13) and then rearrange for RL.  The solution for the exit threshold is  
(2.14)    2
2 1
L
CR E
r
β δ δβ
 
= − 
−  
, 
where β2/(β2-1) is less than 1 because β2 < 0.  Equation (2.14) shows that the exit 
threshold with real options is less than the exit threshold with standard NPV in equation 
(2.5) by a factor of β2/(β2-1). 
 
2.3. Model 
The entry and exit model in this study is set up with two cases, one without crop 
insurance, and the other with crop insurance to see the effect of crop insurance on 
investment decision-making.  These models form simultaneous equations to be solved 
for the entry and exit threshold.  The assumptions to derive the models are presented.  
Then the entry and exit models, without and with revenue insurance, are presented, 
respectively. 
 
2.3.1. Model Assumptions 
First, we assume a competitive industry to derive the entry and exit model 
(Leahy).  At the farm level, an investment or capital budgeting choice is a long-term and 
strategic decision.  In a long-term perspective, many farmers can join or leave grape 
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farming according to market conditions.  They act competitively so that abnormal 
project values, either higher or lower project value compared with zero project value, 
disappear.  That is, in a competitive industry, positive project values induce more 
inactive farmers to enter farming, where inactive farmers are farmers who could 
potentially enter grape farming.  Negative project values lead to active farmers leaving 
the business, where active farmers are farmers who are currently engaged in farming.  
The competition leads to a dynamic equilibrium in the long run through price and thus 
revenue adjustment.  To emphasize the entry and exit thresholds in a competitive market, 
following Leahy, the upper and lower reflecting barriers are interchangeably used for the 
entry and exit thresholds in model derivation.  In a competitive market, when the price 
flow or revenue flow reaches the entry threshold, new farmers enter the business that 
increases the output quantities in the market.  As a result, the market price or revenue is 
slightly brought back to a lower level from the entry threshold immediately.  When the 
market price or revenue reaches the exit threshold, active farmers exit the farming, thus 
increasing market price or revenue slightly.  Thus entry and exit thresholds work as the 
upper and lower reflecting barriers in a competitive market, respectively.  However, in 
any case, the arbitrage drives the market price and revenue into the entry threshold for 
inactive farms and exit threshold for active farms, thus resulting in the equilibrium prices 
or revenues, respectively.  Thus, when making an investment decision, the farmer needs 
to consider the potential entrance of competitive farmers.  We assume that there are 
many grape farmers and their competitive investment decisions affect market price.  We 
also assume a homogeneous product so that each farmer has the same price.   
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Uncertainty in the competitive industry could be farm specific or industry-wide 
(or aggregate uncertainty), where the former can be explained by the uncertainty of 
management skill (or technology) and commodity specific demand and the latter can be 
explained by aggregate demand uncertainty or a widespread disaster in production.  In 
this paper, we focus on the industry-wide uncertainty because much of the uncertainties 
in agriculture are caused by market conditions or production dependency on nature.  In a 
competitive industry, price is an endogenous variable determined by the demand and 
production relationships, where both are assumed uncertain, thus, price moves 
stochastically.  Yield also changes stochastically because of production uncertainty.  The 
yield and price correlation is included in the specification of price and yield stochastic 
processes in the next section. 
In the model, the investment costs are assumed partially reversible, which results 
in salvage values from the project, such as lands, facilities, and machinery.  On the other 
hand, the exit from the farming entails costs, such as the cost to remove the vineyard.  In 
this study, we assume that the exit costs totally counteract the salvage values so that both 
factors can be eliminated in the model.  However, we conduct sensitivity analysis to see 
the effect of the exit costs and salvage values on the entry and exit thresholds.  Once a 
farmer exits farming, investment costs to enter farming again are the same as before, so 
that a temporary suspension and resumption without a penalty is not allowed.  Variable 
cost is assumed relatively predictable and thus the risk free rate is used to discount it 
(Pindyck; Price and Wetzstein). 
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To derive the entry and exit model, we can use a dynamic programming 
approach or contingent claim analysis that lead to the same solution (Dixit and Pindyck).  
The latter requires a risk free portfolio with existing assets to evaluate the option value to 
invest.  However, a dynamic programming approach can be used to maximize the 
present value of cash flow without such assumption.  This approach requires the 
assumption of risk preferences or risk adjusted discount rates.  In this study, we follow 
the dynamic programming approach because the agricultural uncertainty cannot be 
easily replicated.  We use the risk-adjusted discount rate to discount uncertain revenue 
flow. 
 
2.3.2. Entry and Exit Model with No Revenue Insurance2 
The stochastic evolution of the value of a project over time affects the investment 
decision.  The stochastic processes of relevant variables are needed to obtain the 
stochastic evolution.  We assume price and yield are stochastic variables that follow 
geometric Brownian motion (Turvey 1992b; Price and Wetzstein).  When price and yield 
follow geometric Brownian motions, revenue R also follows a geometric Brownian 
motion:  
(2.15)   dR = αRRdt + σRRdzR,  
where α is the drift rate, σ is the volatility rate, dt is a small time increment, and dz is the 
increment of the standard Brownian motion (or Wiener process).     
                                                 
2
 The mathematical procedures to derive the entry and exit model by Dixit and Pindyck are provided in 
appendix A.  
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Given the stochastic process of equation (2.15), the value of an inactive farm that 
has the opportunity to enter the farming, and the value of an active farm that has the 
option value to exit the farming are determined simultaneously.  In a competitive 
industry, the entry and exit thresholds play roles as the upper and lower reflecting 
barriers that are the equilibrium revenues for inactive farmers and active farmers, 
respectively (Leahy).  Dixit and Pindyck provide the simultaneous equations for the 
solution of thresholds with price uncertainty under dynamic equilibrium in a competitive 
industry.3  The simultaneous equations are given as 
(2.16)   1 21 1 2 2( ) ( ) HH H
R CB A R B A R I
r
β β
δ− + − + − =  
(2.17)   1 21 11 1 1 2 2 2
1( ) ( ) 0H HB A R B A Rβ ββ β δ
− −
− + − + =  
(2.18)   1 21 1 2 2( ) ( ) LL L
R CB A R B A R E
r
β β
δ− + − + − = −  
(2.19)   1 21 11 1 1 2 2 2
1( ) ( ) 0H HB A R B A Rβ ββ β δ
− −
− + − + = , 
where βi are the roots of the fundamental quadratic equation.  A i and B i are constants to 
be determined, where 11A R
β
 is the value of the option to invest for an inactive farm and 
2
2B R
β is the value of the option to exit for an active farm.  22A R
β
 is the increase in the 
value of an inactive farm from the lower reflecting barrier and  11B R
β
 is the decrease in 
the value of an active farm from the upper reflecting barrier caused by competitions.  As 
explained in section 2.3.1, in a competitive market, the arbitrage drives the market price 
                                                 
3
 Detailed procedures are provided in appendix A.  
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or revenue at the upper reflecting barrier for an inactive farm but does not allow them to 
rise above that barrier.  Thus the value of an inactive farm must be adjusted to the 
downward direction.  Also the arbitrage prevents the market price or revenue from going 
down below the lower reflecting barrier for an active farm.  Thus the value of an active 
farm must be adjusted the upward direction.  C is the variable cost, I is the investment 
cost, r is the risk free rate of return, δ is the risk and growth adjusted discount rate.  E is 
the exit cost adjusted by the salvage value.  δ is commonly assumed to be greater than 
zero (ρ > α) otherwise no optimum exists and waiting is the best decision.   
Equations (2.16) and (2.18) are value-matching conditions, one for the entry 
threshold and the other for the exit threshold, that require the value of waiting to equal 
the value of investing at the entry and exit thresholds, respectively.  Equations (2.17) and 
(2.19) are smooth-pasting conditions, one for the entry threshold and the other for the 
exit threshold, that require the same slopes of the value of waiting and the value of 
investing at each threshold level.  However, in a perspective of the upper and lower 
reflecting barriers caused by a competitive equilibrium, those conditions can be 
interpreted as the results of the arbitrage among inactive farmers and active farmers, 
respectively.  The last two terms in equations (2.16) and (2.18) denote the expected net 
present values of an infinite annuity of profit, where revenue flow is discounted by the 
risk and growth adjusted discount rate and constant cost is discounted by risk free rate.  
By setting (B1-A1) and (B2-A2) as K1 and K2, we can solve the simultaneous equation 
with four unknowns, K1, K2, RH, and RL.  These equations are highly non-linear in the 
thresholds, RH and RL, thus the symbolic solution cannot be obtained and instead a 
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numerical procedure is required to get the solution.  We use the MathCad 8 Professional 
to solve this simultaneous equation.  In the model, the optimal entry and exit thresholds 
are equilibrium revenue levels worked as upper and lower reflecting barriers, 
respectively, which result in zero option value of waiting for inactive farmers (A1=A2=0).  
From the entry and exit thresholds, the inaction gap is defined as the difference between 
the entry threshold and the exit threshold that leads to no action to exit the farming from 
entering the farming.  This concept of inaction gap is sometimes useful for the 
interpretation of the results. 
 
2.3.3. Entry and Exit Model with Revenue Insurance 
Revenue insurance guarantees a revenue floor ( R ) but also requires a constant 
insurance premium, thus increasing the variable cost.  Thus, the revenue insurance 
affects the entry and exit thresholds.  The revenue guarantee induces more inactive 
farmers to invest and more active farmers to stay in farming.  However, revenue 
insurance requires that an active producer pay the insurance premium, which reduces the 
net revenue flow and decreases the attractiveness of entry, so that we need to consider 
the trade off between the revenue guarantee and insurance premium.   
To see the effect of revenue insurance on the entry and exit decision, the model 
can be set up in two cases.  The first case is when the revenue guarantee, R , is greater 
than the exit threshold, RL, but less than the variable cost CΦ, ( LR R C
r
δ
Φ≤ ≤ ), where 
the variable cost includes insurance premium Φ, thus defined as CΦ = C+Φ.  The second 
case is when the revenue guarantee is greater than the variable cost but less than the long 
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run average cost ( C R C I
r r
δ δ δΦ Φ≤ ≤ + ).  In this study, we focus on the first case 
because it is rare for the revenue guarantee from crop insurance to exceed the variable 
cost otherwise buying revenue insurance always guarantees nonnegative profit that is not 
common in agricultural production.  Even though the revenue guarantee is less than the 
variable cost, two sub-cases must be considered (figure 2.2).  Figure 2.2 shows these two 
sub-cases of revenue flow to be modeled for the study, where RL is the exit threshold, R 
is the revenue flow, R  is the revenue guarantee, and RH is the entry threshold.  In the 
figure 2.2, the first sub-case is LR R R≤ ≤  and the second sub-case is HR R R≤ ≤ .  In 
the first sub-case, where revenue is greater than the exit threshold but less than the 
revenue guarantee, LR R R≤ ≤ , the revenue guarantee is binding.  In the second sub-
case, where revenue is greater than the revenue guarantee but less than entry threshold, 
HR R R≤ ≤ , the revenue guarantee is not binding.   
 
                 1st Case ( LR R R≤ ≤ )     2nd Case ( HR R R≤ ≤ )                 
  0         RL                                   R                                      RH                   R 
     (Exit threshold)                (Revenue guarantee)                     (Entry threshold)   (Revenue flow) 
 
Figure 2.2. Two cases of revenue flow to derive the entry and exit model under 
revenue insurance 
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Consider the first sub-case, LR R R≤ ≤ .  If revenue is greater than the exit 
threshold and less than the revenue guarantee, then the value of investing for the active 
farmer4 is  
(2.20)   1 21 2( )
CRV R B R B R
r r
β βΦ
= − + + , 
where CΦ  is the variable cost with insurance premium, which includes a subsidy from 
the government, and B1 and B2 are the constants to be determined.  The first two terms in 
equation (2.20) are the expected present value of an infinite annuity of profit with 
revenue insurance, where the revenue has the lower boundary caused by revenue 
guarantee and thus discounted by the risk free rate.  The other two terms are the value of 
an active farm adjusted by reaching the revenue guarantee and the option value to exit 
for an active farm, respectively, which are caused by revenue insurance and 
competitions. 
As before, we also have the value matching condition V(RL)= -E and smooth-
pasting condition '( ) 0LV R = .  This value matching condition is obtained by setting the 
option value of waiting to zero (V0(R) = 0) because the option value of waiting in a 
competitive market is zero from competitions.  The positive option value of waiting 
means the possibility of the positive project value, which induces more farmers to the 
farming and thus makes the option value of waiting disappear in a competitive market.  
However, the value of an active farm is adjusted from the reflecting barrier caused by 
                                                 
4
 The derivation of equation (2.20) is provided in appendix A. 
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competitions.  This adjusted value in a competitive market works like the option value of 
waiting for an inactive farm with the exclusive right to invest.   
For the second sub-case when revenue is greater than the revenue guarantee, but 
less than the entry threshold, HR R R≤ ≤ , the project value is  
(2.21)   1 23 4( )
CRV R B R B R
r
β β
δ
Φ
= − + + , 
where B3 and B4 are the constants to be determined.  In equation (2.21), the expected 
present value of an annuity of revenue is discounted by the risk and growth adjusted 
discount rate, where the revenue is not bounded from the floor, but the cost is discounted 
by the risk free rate.   
The key parameter of the real option model affected by crop insurance is the 
discount rate.  Thus given crop insurance, we need to adjust the discount rate of revenue 
because the revenue guarantee eliminates downside risk, thus changing the distribution 
of revenue.  We reduce the risk premium rate in the discount rate of revenue by the 
insurance coverage level (50-75%) of the expected revenue because the farmer can 
eliminate the downside risk by that much.  However, we still use the same volatility rate 
to consider the potential movement of revenue flow in equation (2.20) and (2.21) even 
though the actual revenue flow is bounded by the revenue floor.  When the potential 
revenue in a competitive industry is far below the revenue guarantee, the farmer knows 
that the actual revenue received stays at the revenue guarantee longer than if the 
potential revenue were close to the revenue guarantee.  The farmer prefers the latter to 
the former for the investment decision.  Thus, the potential movement of revenue is an 
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important factor for the farmer’s investment decision with crop insurance, which is 
consistent with the assumption used by Dixit and Pindyck.  Given the parameters and 
adjustments for crop insurance, the derivation of the option value model proceeds in the 
usual way.  The other two terms in equation (2.21) are the value of an active farm 
adjusted by reaching the revenue guarantee and the value of the option to exit for an 
active farm, respectively, which are caused by revenue insurance and competitions.  The 
respective value matching and smooth-pasting conditions are V(RH) = I and '( ) 0HV R = .   
Assuming the value function V(R) is continuously differentiable around R , we 
get the following equation (2.22) by equating equations (2.20) and (2.21) at R  and 
rearranging them.  Then by differentiating equation (2.22) with respect to R at R , 
equation (2.23) is obtained.  These are value matching and smooth pasting conditions to 
connect the first sub-case and the second sub-case under the continuous revenue flow in 
the figure 2.2.  
(2.22)   1 21 3 2 4( ) ( ) 0
R R B B R B B R
r
β β
δ− + − + − =  
(2.23)   1 21 11 1 3 2 2 4
1 ( ) ( ) 0B B R B B Rβ ββ βδ
− −
− + − + − = . 
Additionally, from the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions, V(RL)= -E 
and '( ) 0LV R =  for the exit threshold from equation (2.20) and V(RH) = I and 
'( ) 0HV R =  for the entry threshold from equation (2.21), we have four more equations to 
solve. 
(2.24)   1 21 2L L
CR B R B R E
r r
β βΦ
− + + = −  
 28 
(2.25)   1 21 11 1 2 2 0L LB R B Rβ ββ β− −+ =  
(2.26)   1 23 4H H H
R C B R B R I
r
β β
δ
Φ
− + + =  
(2.27)   1 21 11 3 2 4
1 0H HB R B R
β ββ βδ
− −+ + = . 
Now we have six simultaneous equations from (2.22) to (2.27) and six unknowns 
that include four constants, B1, B2, B3, and B4, and two thresholds, RH and RL.  These 
equations also are highly non-linear in the thresholds, RH and RL, thus analytical solution 
cannot be obtained and thus numerical solution is required.  
  
2.4. Data 
Table 2.1 summarizes data on California table grapes used in this study 
(California Agricultural Statistics Service).  The price and yield series are statewide from 
1987 to 2002.  In the next section, we provide data with and without revenue insurance. 
  
2.4.1. Data without Revenue Insurance 
Yield and price volatility rates and drift rates are estimated from the logarithm of 
data because the real option approach in this study assumes the geometric Brownian 
motion of the stochastic process, where the volatility rate is the rate for variability of 
revenue flow and the drift rate is the rate for trend of revenue flow.  The yield and price 
series show positive drift rates (trends) of 0.003 and 0.033, respectively, and the yield 
and price volatility rates are 0.142 and 0.202, respectively.  The correlation between the 
yield and price is –0.58.  Given the drift rates and volatility rates in yield and price, those 
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of revenue are 0.019 and 0.167 that are calculated by considering correlation.  Appendix 
A shows the mathematical procedure how to get those parameters in details.   
The economic life of a table grape vineyard is twenty-five years and grape 
harvesting begins in the fourth year (University of California-Cooperative Extension).  
Grape farming is an ongoing business, and we assume that the grape vineyard is replaced 
at the end of twenty-five years with a similar vineyard (Price and Wetzstein).  Thus we 
assume an infinite horizon model.  The investment cost includes the initial investment 
cost and three years of operating cost for vineyard establishment.  Initial investment 
costs with land, irrigation system, buildings, tools, fuel tanks and pump, vineyard 
establishment, and equipment are $11,921 per acre and the first three years of operating 
costs with planting costs, cultural costs, harvest costs, and cash overhead costs are 
$4,951 per acre, thus making the total investment cost $16,872 per acre (University of 
California-Cooperative Extension).  In our infinity model, we just assume that the initial 
investment cost and the three years’ operating costs take place at a time.  And the 
revenue flow is assumed constant from the beginning of the business.  The operating 
costs with cultural costs, harvest costs, post-harvest costs, and cash overhead costs are 
$5,676 per acre, per year.   
The risk free rate and risk-adjusted rate are assumed as 0.057 and 0.07, 
respectively, where the risk free rate is the average rate obtained from 3-year Treasury 
constant maturity rate from 1997 to 2000 (Financial Forecast Center) to match with the 
1998 budget data used in this study.  Both rates are comparable to 0.08 and 0.06 from 
Price and Wetzstein.  Given the risk-adjusted rate, the risk and growth adjusted discount  
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Table 2.1. Parameters Used for Table Grape Farming with and without Revenue 
Insurance 
 
Parameters Insurances or Stochastic Variables Parameter Values 
Investment Cost ($/acre)  16,872 
   No Insurance 5,676 
   60% Coverage Insurance 5,771 
Variable Cost ($/acre) 
   75% Coverage Insurance 5,898 
Expected Revenue ($/acre)  7,000 
   60% Coverage Insurance 4,200 Guaranteed Revenue ($/acre) 
   75% Coverage Insurance 5,250 
   60% Coverage Insurance 6.3 Insurance Premium Rate (%)a 
   75% Coverage Insurance 9.4 
   60% Coverage Insurance 36.0 Producer Premium Rate (%)a 
   75% Coverage Insurance 45.0 
   Yield 0.003 
   Price 0.033 
Drift Rate 
   Revenue 0.019 
   Yield 0.142 
   Price 0.202 
Volatility Rate 
   Revenue 0.167 
Correlation between Price and Yield  -0.58 
   No Insurance 2.065 
   60% Coverage Insurance 2.000 
Positive Beta 
    
   75% Coverage Insurance 1.984 
   No Insurance -2.422 
   60% Coverage Insurance -2.357 
Negative Beta 
   75% Coverage Insurance -2.341 
   No Insurance 0.070 
   60% Coverage Insurance 0.066 
Risk Adjusted Rate 
   75% Coverage Insurance 0.065 
Risk Free Rate  0.057 
   No Insurance 0.013 
   60% Coverage Insurance 0.009 
Risk Premium Rate 
   75% Coverage Insurance 0.008 
   No Insurance 0.051 
   60% Coverage Insurance 0.047 
Risk and Growth Adjusted Discount Rate 
   75% Coverage Insurance 0.046 
a
 Includes the insurance premium subsidy. 
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rate defined as the difference between the risk-adjusted rate 0.07 and the drift rate of 
revenue 0.019, is 0.051.  Given parameters obtained above, the positive root of the 
fundamental quadratic equation β1 is 2.065 and the negative root of the fundamental 
quadratic equation β2 is –2.422, respectively.   
 
2.4.2. Data with Revenue Insurance 
Revenue insurance provides a revenue coverage level ranging from 50% to 85% 
by 5% increments of expected revenue, and a producer premium rate (subsidized) 
ranging from 33% to 62% of the expected indemnity, respectively (table 2.1).  For each 
coverage level, a price election factor of either 95% or 100% is available.  The 60% and 
75% coverage levels of approved revenue with price election factor of 100% are chosen 
for the study because 75% coverage level is most common among whole revenue 
coverage levels and 60% coverage level is most common among low revenue coverage 
levels across all crops with revenue insurance in 2004 crop year in California (USDA-
RMA 2004a), resulting in the producer premium rate of 36% and 45%, respectively 
(table 2.1).  Thompson seedless grapes in San Joaquin County California in 2002 is used 
to calculate the producer premium.  The expected revenue is $7,000, thus the guaranteed 
revenues with coverage levels of 60% and 75% are $4,200 and $5,250, respectively 
(University of California-Cooperative Extension).  The base premium rates are assumed 
6.3% for 60% coverage level and 9.4% for 75% coverage level based on grower yield 
certification (GYC) insurance, a yield insurance mainly applied to some perennial crops, 
resulting in the premium of $95 and $222, respectively (USDA-RMA 2004b).  
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Operating costs after the insurance premiums are $5,771 for 60% coverage level and 
$5,898 for 75% coverage level.  The risk-adjusted rate is adjusted to consider the change 
in the risk premium rate because revenue insurance reduces downside risk.  The risk 
premium rate with 60% insurance coverage level is reduced by 30%.  The effect of 
different level of risk premium rate can be observed by doing sensitivity analysis.  The 
new risk premium rate and risk adjusted-rate with 60% insurance coverage level are 
0.009 and 0.066, respectively.  The risk premium rate with 75% insurance coverage level 
is reduced by 37.5% that results in the new risk premium rate 0.008 and risk-adjusted 
rate 0.065.  The new the risk and growth adjusted discount rates with 60% insurance 
coverage level and 75% coverage level are 0.047 and 0.046, respectively.  The changes 
in risk-adjusted rate produce new roots of the quadratic equation, 1β  and 2β , where the 
positive roots with 60% coverage level and 75% coverage level are 2.000 and 1.984, 
respectively, and the negative roots with 60% coverage level and 75% coverage level are 
–2.357 and –2.341, respectively. 
 
2.5. Results 
In what follows, the entry and exit thresholds with a real option approach are 
provided for the base case.  Also, the results using sensitivity analysis are presented.  
Then the effects of revenue insurance on the entry and exit thresholds are provided. 
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2.5.1. The Entry and Exit Thresholds with Real Options Approach 
The entry and exit thresholds, market revenues, derived from a standard NPV, 
based on the Marshallian long run average cost and average variable cost, are 
$5,939/acre and $5,079/acre, respectively (table 2.2).  The former is the entry threshold 
that allows the inactive farmer to enter the grape farming as long as the market revenue 
is greater than or equal to that number.  On the other hand, the latter is the exit threshold 
that allows the active farmer to gets out of the farming when the market revenue reaches 
that level.  Given the parameters, the simultaneous equations from equation (2.16) to 
equation (2.19) produce the entry and exit thresholds with the real option, where the 
entry threshold is $10,790/acre and the exit threshold is $4,867/acre.  The former 
explains that the inactive farmer enters the farming when the market revenue reaches 
that level of revenue and the latter explains that the active farmer exits the farming when 
the market revenue reaches that level of revenue.  The entry threshold with real option 
approach is higher than that of standard NPV by 81.7 percent and the exit threshold with 
real option is lower than that of standard NPV by 4.2 percent.  These results support the 
literature in finding a significant effect of accounting for uncertainty in the investment 
decision.  The entry threshold of revenue with real option that would stimulate 
investment is almost double the entry threshold of revenue under standard NPV analysis.   
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Table 2.2. Entry and Exit Thresholds by NPV and Real Options Approaches  
 
                Items NPVb Real Optionsc Percentage Change 
  Entry Threshold ($/acre)a 5,939 10,790 81.7 
  Exit Threshold ($/acre) a 5,079 4,867 -4.2 
a 
 Entry and exit thresholds are the levels of current revenue flows to trigger the entry 
and the exit for the farming. 
b
 Those are calculated from the equation (2.3) and (2.5), respectively. 
c
 Those are calculated from the simultaneous equation (2.16) through (2.19).  
 
 
The sensitivity of the results is considered by changing the value of one 
parameter while holding all other parameters constant (table 2.3).  The magnitude of 
change for each parameter values was selected to give reasonable results.  The 
sensitivity of the variable cost, investment cost, exit cost, risk premium rate, risk free 
rate, drift rate, and volatility rate is tested. 
The variable cost was increased by $1,000/acre to determine the sensitivity of 
entry and exit thresholds to the variable cost (Table 2.3).  The entry and exit thresholds 
are increased by $1,520/acre (14.1%) and $950/acre (19.5%), respectively.  The increase 
in variable cost reduces the profit from the farming so that the inactive farmer requires a 
higher revenue flow to enter the farming and the current farmer exits the farming earlier 
to reduce the subsequent loss.  As expected, a higher variable cost results in less 
investment in table grape farming and faster exit from the table grape farming.  Higher 
variable costs reduce the inaction gap, defined as the difference between the entry 
threshold and the exit threshold.  
The investment cost was increased by $4,000/acre to determine the sensitivity of 
entry and exit thresholds to the investment cost (table 2.3).  The entry threshold is 
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increased by $490/acre (4.5%) and the exit threshold is decreased by $104/acre (2.1%), 
respectively.  This is because a large investment cost entails a large sunk cost so that the 
inactive farmer needs a large return from the investment and the inactive farmer wants to 
recover the large sunk cost, if possible, by waiting further.  Higher initial investment 
costs widen the inaction gap, thus inducing less investment and less departure from 
farming operation.   
The exit cost was increased by $3,000/acre to determine the sensitivity of entry 
and exit thresholds to the exit cost (table 2.3).  The entry threshold is increased by 
$110/acre (1.0%) and exit threshold is decreased by $238/acre (4.9%), respectively.  The 
inactive farmer requires a higher revenue threshold to offset the exit cost and the active 
farmer needs to wait longer because that decision entails the exit cost.  The change in the 
entry threshold is not sensitive to the change in the exit cost compared with the case of 
the investment cost because the length of the investment is expected to be long and the 
discount factor used to discount the exit cost is high.  Thus, the increase in the exit cost 
discourages the investment and disinvestments and thus widens the inaction gap but not 
very much.   
The risk premium was increased by 0.013 to determine the sensitivity of entry 
and exit thresholds to the risk premium (table 2.3).  The entry and exit thresholds are 
increased by$1,800/acre (16.7%) and $1,047/acre (21.5%), respectively.  Thus, the 
increase in the risk premium rate induces less investment by inactive farmers and 
induces more active producers to exit the table grape farming.  This is because the higher 
discount factor in revenue caused by higher risk premium rate decreases the expected 
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present value of revenue flow while constant discount factor in variable cost does not 
change the expected present value of cost flow.  Thus, a higher revenue threshold is 
required to compensate for the reduced present value of revenue flow.   
The risk free rate was increased by 0.02 to determine the sensitivity of entry and 
exit thresholds to the risk free rate (table 2.3).  The entry and exit thresholds are 
decreased by $100/acre (0.9%) and $192/acre (3.9%), respectively.  This result is 
opposite to that of the NPV approach that increases both the entry and exit thresholds, 
where only higher discount rate discourages the investment decision.  This difference is 
caused by the assumption of a competitive market in real options.  When the project 
value is decreased, then many active farmers will leave the farming immediately.  
However, this leads to the decrease in the output that falls short of market demand, thus 
increasing market price and revenue.  This increases the option to exit for the active 
farmer and makes him/her stay in farming longer.  The inactive farmer also expects 
higher market price and revenue from the low project value that causes the shortage of 
output for the market demand.  Thus, the inactive farmer has the incentive to invest 
when the risk free rate increases.  
The drift rate of revenue was increased by 0.016 to determine the sensitivity of 
entry and exit thresholds to the drift rate (table 2.3).  The entry and exit thresholds are 
decreased by $380/acre (3.5%) and $246/acre (5.1%), respectively.  Thus, the higher the 
drift rate, the higher the investment in table grape farming and the slower the exit from 
table grape farming.  When the expectation that grape production revenue will increase 
goes up, more farmers that are inactive will invest in grape production and active 
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farmers will tend to stay in farming and require lower levels of revenue before exiting 
the business. 
The volatility rate was increased by 0.052 to determine the sensitivity of entry 
and exit thresholds to the volatility rate (table 2.3).  The entry threshold is increased by 
$940/acre (8.7%) and the exit threshold is decreased by $253/acre (5.2%).  These results 
imply that as uncertainty increases, both the inactive farmer and the active farmer must 
wait longer because the inactive farmer requires more rewards and the option to exit for 
the active farm is more valuable.  It widens the inaction gap, thus inducing less 
investment and less leaving in table grape farming.    
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Table 2.3. Entry and Exit Thresholds and Their Sensitivity to Changes in Selected 
Parameters 
 
Parameters  Entry Threshold ($/acre)a  Exit Threshold ($/acre)a 
Name Value  NPVb Real Optionsc 
Percentage 
Change NPV
b
 
Real 
Optionsc 
Percentage 
Change 
        
4,676 5,044 9,257 -14.2 4,184 3,932 -19.2 
5,676 5,939 10,790  5,079 4,867   Variable Cost 
 ($/acre) 6,676 6,834 12,310 14.1 5,973 5,817 19.5 
           
12,872 5,735 10,270 -4.8 5,079 4,998 2.7 
16,872 5,939 10,790  5,079 4,867   Investment 
 Cost ($/acre) 20,872 6,143 11,280 4.5 5,079 4,763 -2.1 
          
-3,000 5,939 10,670 -1.1 5,232 5,127 5.3 
0 5,939 10,790  5,079 4,867   Exit Cost  
 ($/acre) 3,000 5,939 10,900 1.0 4,926 4,629 -4.9 
          
0 4,425 8,969 -16.9 3,784 3,839 -21.1 
0.013 5,939 10,790  5,079 4,867  
 Risk 
 Premium 
 Rate 0.026 7,453 12,590 16.7 6,373 5,914 21.5 
          
0.032 5,297 11,360 5.3 4,756 5,337 9.7 
0.052 5,939 10,790  5,079 4,867   Risk Free 
 Rate 0.072 6,432 10,690 -0.9 5,234 4,675 -3.9 
  
         
0.003 7,802 11,220 4.0 6,672 5,106 4.9 
0.019 5,939 10,790  5,079 4,867   Drift Rate  
0.035 4,076 10,410 -3.5 3,485 4,621 -5.1 
          
0.114 5,939 9,808 -9.1 5,079 5,161 6.0 
0.167 5,939 10,790  5,079 4,867   Volatility 
 Rate  
0.219 5,939 11,730 8.7 5,079 4,614 -5.2 
a  Entry and exit thresholds are the levels of current revenue flows to trigger the entry and 
the exit for the farming. 
b
 Those are calculated from the equation (2.3) and (2.5), respectively. 
c
 Those are calculated from the simultaneous equation (2.16) through (2.19).  
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2.5.2. The Effect of Revenue Insurance on the Entry and Exit Thresholds 
The entry and exit thresholds with 60% coverage level with actual (subsidized) 
insurance premium rate of 6.3% are $10,360 and $4,765, respectively (table 2.4).  The 
revenue guarantee of $4,200 is less than the exit threshold, $4,765, thus it has no effect 
on the entry and exit thresholds and all of the effects are from the risk reducing effect 
through the risk premium change.  Revenue insurance with 60% coverage level 
decreases the entry threshold by 4% and the exit threshold by 2% compared with no 
insurance, resulting in the encouragement of the investment and current farming 
operation. 
The entry and exit thresholds with 75% coverage level with actual (subsidized) 
insurance premium of 9.4% are $10,380 and $4,097, respectively (table 2.4).  The 
revenue guarantee of $5,250 is greater than the exit threshold, $4,077, thus the guarantee 
affects both the entry and exit thresholds that are also affected by the risk premium 
change.  Revenue insurance with 75% coverage level decreases the entry threshold by 
4% and the exit threshold by 16%, resulting in the encouragement of the investment and 
current farming operation.   
Results show that the entry and exit thresholds with revenue insurance are lower 
than with no revenue insurance (table 2.4).  The entry threshold with 75% coverage level 
is higher than with 60% coverage level but the exit threshold with 75% coverage level is 
less than with 60% coverage level.  The revenue floor that is greater than the exit 
threshold in 75% coverage level and less than the threshold in 60% coverage level is the 
main cause of the difference.  Thus, the size of the revenue guarantee is important as 
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well as the risk reducing effect of revenue insurance to affect the entry and exit 
thresholds. 
The sensitivity analysis with the change in insurance premium rate shows that the 
increase of insurance premium rate increases both the entry and exit thresholds, thus 
discouraging both the investment and current farming operation (table 2.4).  At high 
insurance premium rate of 30%, both the entry and exit thresholds exceed the entry and 
exit thresholds with no insurance in both coverage levels.  Thus, the high insurance 
premium rate discourages the investment and current farming operation.  On the other 
hand, at low insurance premium rate, both the entry and exit thresholds are lower than no 
insurance in both coverage levels.  Thus, the lower insurance coverage level encourages 
the investment and current farming operation.   
This result implies that an increasing subsidy rate, that decreases the insurance 
premium rate, results in the encouragement of the investment and current farming 
operation.  On the other hand, given the insurance premium rate, the insurance policy 
with high revenue guarantee above the exit threshold has a stronger effect on the exit 
threshold as well as the entry threshold than with low revenue guarantee.  This implies 
that if a policy goal is to induce more farmers to grow a certain crop, the insurance 
policy with higher coverage level is more effective.   
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Table 2.4. Entry and Exit Thresholds by Insurance Premium Rate 
 
Entry Threshold ($/acre)a  Exit Threshold ($/acre)a 
Item 
  Insurance  
  Premium 
  Rate (%) NPV
b
 
Real  
Optionsc 
Percent 
Change  NPV
b
 
Real  
Optionsc 
Percent 
Change 
No Insurance  5,939 10,790  5,079 4,867  
Insurance        
0 5,473 10,230 -5.2 4,680 4,668 -4.1 
6.3 5,552 10,360 -4.0 4,759 4,765 -2.1 
20 5,722 10,660 -1.2 4,929 4,963 2.0 
   60% 
Coverage  
   Level 
30 5,848 10,870 0.7 5,055 5,097 4.7 
        
0 5,357 10,020 -7.1 4,581 3,486 -28.4 
9.4 5,536 10,380 -3.8 4,760 4,097 -15.8 
20 5,738 10,760 -0.3 4,962 4,610 -5.3 
   75% 
Coverage  
   Level 
  30 5,929 11,100 2.9 5,153 4,995 2.6 
a
 Entry and exit thresholds are the levels of current revenue flows to trigger the entry and 
the exit for the farming. 
b
 Those are calculated from the equation (2.3) and (2.5), respectively. 
c
 Those are calculated from the simultaneous equation (2.22) through (2.27). 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This study applies the real options approach to investigate the effect that crop 
insurance has on agricultural investment.  Specifically, we set up the entry and exit 
model using real options in a competitive market.  With this model, we determine the 
entry and exit thresholds using real option approach of table grape farming in California 
assuming irreversible investments under uncertainty.   
The results show that the entry and exit thresholds for grape production in 
California using the real option approach are $10,790 and $4,867, respectively.  This 
means that revenues per acre from grape production would need to be at least 
$10,790/acre before an inactive farmer would invest in grape production.  Moreover, 
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grape revenues would need to drop below $4867/acre before an exiting grape producer 
would leave grape production.  Compared with the entry and exit threshold values 
calculated using NPV, $5,939 and $5,079, respectively, the entry threshold with real 
option approach is higher and the exit threshold with real option is lower.  Analysis that 
only uses NPV does not adequately model the timing of investment and disinvestment 
and can provide incorrect investment and disinvestment signals.   
The sensitivity of the model parameters was investigated.  The magnitude of the 
entry and exit threshold changes varies according to the parameter selected.  For 
example, when the volatility rate is increased by 0.052, the entry threshold is increased 
by $940/acre (8.7%) while when the exit cost is increased by $3,000/acre, the entry 
threshold is only increased by $100/acre (4.5%).  Thus, to affect the investment and 
disinvestment decisions, the selection of the parameter needs to be considered.  Also, the 
appropriate parameter values suitable for each potential region must be chosen when 
making investment decision in table grapes. 
Revenue insurance with actual (subsidized) insurance premium decreases the 
entry and exit thresholds compared with no revenue insurance.  Thus, the revenue 
insurance encourages new investment and encourages current farming operation to stay 
in business.  Increasing insurance premium rate increases both the entry and exit 
threshold, thus discouraging new investment and giving more incentive for current 
farming operation to leave grape production.  This implies that a government subsidy 
that decreases the insurance premium rate, results in the encouragement of new 
investment and encouragement for current farmers to stay in business.  On the other 
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hand, given the insurance premium rate, the insurance policy with a high revenue 
guarantee above the exit threshold has a stronger effect on the exit threshold as well as 
the entry threshold than insurance polices with a low revenue guarantee.  This implies 
that if a policy goal is to induce more farmers to produce a certain crop, the insurance 
policy with higher coverage level is more effective. 
These results also can be applied to the regions, such as southern Arizona, 
northern New Mexico, and Texas that may grow table grapes with some modification of 
the parameters.  Also, this study can be extended to include other risk management 
programs and other crops for the investment analysis.  
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CHAPTER III 
EFFECTS OF FEDERAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS ON OPTIMAL 
ACREAGE ALLOCATION AND NITROGEN USE IN A TEXAS COTTON-
SORGHUM SYSTEM 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Federal risk management programs such as federal crop insurance and the 
Marketing Loan Program (MLP) have effects beyond directly improving farmer welfare.  
The income and risk changes that result from farmer participation in these and similar 
programs affect crop acreage allocation (the extensive margin) and the use of inputs on 
each crop (the intensive margin).  The extensive and intensive margin effects are 
important, since these effects can counteract or enhance the goals of other programs.  
These effects can induce farmers to increase or decrease acreage of more erosive or 
chemically intensive crops, or to use more or less chemicals on land already allocated to 
specific crops.  For example, Goodwin and Smith find that about half of the reductions 
in soil erosion due to the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) were offset by increases 
in erosion from farmer responses to income support programs.  Similarly, Babcock and 
Hennessy and Smith and Goodwin find that farmers purchasing crop insurance have 
incentives to reduce use of fertilizer and other chemicals.  However, Horowitz and 
Lichtenberg find that crop insurance increases the use of agricultural chemicals. 
The extensive and intensive margin effects of federal risk management programs 
continue to be a pertinent issue as the availability and subsidization of federal risk 
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management programs has increased in recent years.  The Agricultural Risk Protection 
Act (ARPA) of 2000 has resulted in increased premium subsidies and an expansion in 
the types of policies available, the crops covered, and the geographic availability.  Total 
acres covered by crop insurance increased from 182 million in 1998 to 216 million in 
2002, with total liability increasing from $28 billion to $37 billion (USDA-RMA 2002c).  
Among the most popular insurance programs are Actual Production History (APH) yield 
insurance and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) revenue insurance, with liabilities in 2002 
of $15 billion and $8 billion respectively (USDA-RMA 2002c).  The Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act of 2002 continued the Marketing Loan Program (MLP), which 
provides loan deficiency payments as a form of price insurance that protects farmers 
from low prices, much as APH protects from low yields.  Loan deficiency payments 
equaled $6 billion for the 2000 crop year (USDA-FSA 2002a).   
Many studies have analyzed the effects of crop insurance and other federal 
programs to quantify their intensive and/or extensive margin effects and interactions 
among different programs.  These studies have been econometric (Goodwin and Smith; 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg; Smith and Goodwin; Wu), simulation-based (Babcock and 
Hennessy; Chavas and Holt), or mathematical programming based (Kaylen, Loehman, 
and Preckel; Turvey 1992a).  Most studies examine the intensive margin or the extensive 
margin effects of crop insurance in isolation.  An exception is Wu, who found that in 
Nebraska, crop insurance increased acreage for chemically intensive crops at the 
extensive margin and decreased chemical use on crops at the intensive margin, with an 
overall increase in chemical use.  Also, Smith and Goodwin and Goodwin and Smith 
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show the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of farmer behavior when 
examining the intensive or extensive margins and farmer participation in risk 
management programs.   
Among those using a mathematical programming approach, Kaylen, Loehman, 
and Preckel examined the effect of crop insurance on production decisions.  However, 
their analysis did not endogenize the choice of insurance coverage level and the price 
election factor.  Turvey developed a mathematical programming model for a Canadian 
example to examine optimal acreage allocations and farmer welfare with different 
policies and parameters, but did not endogenize input use.   
We develop a mathematical programming model of a representative Texas 
farmer to determine how federal risk management programs affect optimal farm level 
acreage allocation to cotton and sorghum (extensive margin) and the optimal use of 
nitrogen fertilizer on each crop (intensive margin).  We endogenize input use and land 
allocation decisions, as well as the farmer’s participation in federal risk management 
programs for each crop, specifically APH yield insurance, CRC revenue insurance, and 
the MLP.  In addition, we endogenize the farmer’s choice of coverage level and the price 
election factor for APH and CRC.  We combine the mathematical programming and 
simulation-based approaches by using direct expected utility maximizing non-linear 
programming (Lambert and McCarl).  What follows first is a brief review of crop 
insurance programs and the MLP.  Next, we specify the model objective function and 
constraints, and then explain the data and estimation of model parameters.  Finally, we 
present and discuss our empirical results relative to previously published results.   
  
47 
 
3.2. Federal Risk Management Programs 
A farmer with APH insurance coverage receives an indemnity if the harvested 
yield is less than the yield guarantee.  Farmers choose a yield coverage level ranging 
from 50% to 75% (up to 85% in some counties) by 5% increments of the approved APH 
yield and a price election factor ranging from 55% to 100% by 1% increments of the 
officially announced expected market price.  A farmer with CRC insurance receives an 
indemnity if the guaranteed revenue exceeds calculated revenue.  The price for 
calculating revenue is derived from the daily settlement price of futures contracts for a 
given period for an appropriate month for the crop.  Again, the farmer must choose a 
coverage level (50% to 85% by 5% increments) and either a 95% or 100% price election.  
Farmers receive a smaller indemnity with CRC than with APH when the realized market 
price used to calculate the APH indemnity exceeds the CRC base price or harvest price 
used to calculate CRC indemnities.  Farmers participating in the MLP receive a loan 
deficiency payment (LDP) when the marketing loan rate exceeds the posted county price 
or the world market price depending on the crop.  A LDP can be utilized when the 
eligible crop is still owned by the farmer at the time of harvest.  
The specified model includes all eight possible combinations of APH crop 
insurance, CRC revenue insurance, and the MLP.  In each case, the participation in 
insurance programs and/or the MLP is chosen separately for each crop among the 
available alternatives, so that the insurance policy type, the coverage level, and price 
election factor can differ for each crop.  The eight combinations (and their abbreviations) 
are: no program, Marketing Loan Program only, APH crop insurance only, APH crop 
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insurance with the Marketing Loan Program (APH+MLP), CRC revenue insurance only, 
CRC revenue insurance with the Marketing Loan Program (CRC+MLP), both APH crop 
insurance and CRC revenue insurance available (APH+CRC), and both APH crop 
insurance and CRC revenue insurance available with the Marketing Loan Program 
(APH+CRC+MLP).  
 
3.3. Conceptual Framework 
The modeled representative farmer earns income by allocating total acreage A 
and a purchased input x to crops j = 1 to J.  The farmer can also purchase crop or 
revenue insurance and choose to participate in the Marketing Loan Program.  Thus, the 
farmer also chooses the price election factor (PEFij) and coverage level (CVGij) for each 
insurance policy i = 1 to I and crop j.  The farmer can purchase only one type of 
insurance for each crop and if a crop is insured, all planted acres of that crop are insured, 
all with the same price election and coverage level.  However, the farmer can purchase 
different types of insurance for different crops.  These restrictions are in accordance with 
current federal crop insurance programs.   
Per acre income with crop insurance program i and crop j for the most general 
case when all risk management programs are available is:  
(3.1) ( ) −++−−= i ijijijijijijjjjjjjjj CVGPEFMCVGPEFILDPrxcxyp ),(),()( λpi , 
where pj is the random crop price, yj is the random crop yield as a function of the input 
level xj, cj is the non-random variable cost, and r is the non-random price of the input x.  
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LDPj is the random loan deficiency payment and λj is an indicator variable for 
participation in the marketing loan program (λj = 1 if the farmer chooses to participate, 0 
otherwise).  Iij is the random insurance indemnity and Mij is the non-random insurance 
premium for policy i, which both depend on the chosen price election factor (PEFij) and 
coverage level (CVGij).  Because only one type of insurance can be purchased for any 
crop j, at most PEFij > 0 and CVGij > 0 for only one policy i for each crop j.  Income per 
crop is Ajpij, where Aj is acreage planted to crop j, and total crop income pi is the sum of 
income over all crops: = j jjA pipi .   
The representative farmer maximizes the expected utility of income, choosing the 
acreage allocation Aj, input use xj, and participation in the MLP λj for all j, the price 
election factor PEFij and coverage level CVGij for all i and j, and insurance program i: 
(3.2)  1 2 1 2
, , , , ,
max ( ) ( , ,..., , , ,..., )
j j ij ij j
J JA x i PEF CVG
u dF p p p y y y
λ
pi ,  
where u(⋅) is the farmer’s utility function (u′ > 0, u′′ < 0) and F(⋅) is the joint distribution 
function of prices and yields.  Constraints include an acreage allocation constraint 
( ≥ j jAA ), as well as technical constraints on the insurance programs (e.g., one policy 
per crop, and a PEF and a CVG from available levels).  Solving this optimization 
program gives the optimal acreage allocation and input use for each crop (Aj and xj for 
all j), as well as the optimal participation in risk management programs (PEFij, CVGij for 
all i and j, and λj for all j).   
The intensive margin effect of each risk management program for a crop is the 
difference in the optimal use of the input xj when the program is available versus when it 
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is not.  Similarly, the extensive margin effect is the change in optimal acreage Aj when 
the program is available versus when it is not.  Determining the intensive and extensive 
margin effects of these federal risk management programs requires finding the solutions 
to problem (3.2) for the eight possible combinations of program availability.  However, 
once the details of each program are accurately specified, analytical solutions generally 
become intractable.  As a result, we use numerical methods to solve problem (3.2) for a 
representative farmer and sensitivity analysis to generalize from this specific case.   
 
3.4. Empirical Model 
For empirical analysis, we develop data and a model for a case farm in San 
Patricio County, Texas, near Corpus Christi.  Texas accounted for 41% and 33% of total 
U.S. planted acres of cotton and sorghum respectively in 2002 and San Patricio County 
accounted for 2.2% and 2.9% of total cotton and sorghum acres planted in Texas in 2002 
(USDA-NASS).  Followings are the model specifications and data used for the empirical 
analysis.  More detailed mathematical representation is provided in appendix B, where it 
is represented using Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming Model. 
 
3.4.1. Utility and Profit 
The analysis uses direct expected utility maximizing non-linear programming 
(DEMP) in combination with a simulation approach (Lambert and McCarl).  DEMP uses 
mathematical programming to find the crop acreage, input use, and risk management 
program parameters that maximize expected utility as a function of randomly drawn 
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prices and yields.  We use DEMP to maximize expected utility directly, as opposed to 
using quadrature (Kaylen, Loehman, and Preckel), Monte Carlo integration combined 
with a grid search (Hurley, Mitchell and Rice), or a small set of observations as an 
empirical distribution (Turvey; Lambert and McCarl).   
The empirical analysis here uses a negative-exponential (constant absolute risk 
aversion) utility function.  As a result, wealth effects (including those from premiums) 
do not affect production decisions, and so all other income is ignored.  With negative-
exponential utility, the DEMP objective function for problem (3.2) is 
(3.3)    )]exp(1[ −−k kRpi ,  
where k indexes each state (Monte Carlo random draw), R is the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion, and = j jkjk A pipi is profit in state k.  Income from crop j in state k is  
(3.4) ( ) −++−−= i ijijijijijijkjkjjjjjkjkjk CVGPEFMCVGPEFILDPrxcxyp ),(),()( λpi ,  
which is the same as equation (3.1) except that each random variable has an index k.  
Values for R were chosen so the farmer’s risk premium was a reasonable percentage of 
the income standard deviation (Babcock, Choi and Feinerman), which also satisfies the 
upper bound suggested by McCarl and Bessler.  
The APH and CRC insurance indemnities for any state k and crop j are  
(3.5)  }0,max{
,,, jkjjAPH
e
jjAPHjkAPH yyCVGPPEFI −= , 
(3.6)  }0,},max{max{
,,, jkjkjjCRC
h
j
b
jjCRCjkCRC ypyCVGppPEFI −= , 
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where jy  is the average yield used by both APH and CRC, 
e
jp  is the expected price 
used to calculate the APH indemnity, and bjp  and 
h
jp  are the futures price before 
planting (base price) and the futures price before harvest (harvest price) used to calculate 
CRC indemnities.  Available APH and CRC coverage levels in San Patricio County 
range 50% to 85% for cotton and 50% to 75% for sorghum, both by 5% increments.  The 
available APH price election factor ranges from 55% to 100% by 1% increments, but 
with CRC the price election factor is either 95% or 100% (USDA-RMA 2002b). 
The non-random insurance premium for each crop depends on the chosen 
coverage level and the price election factor.  The analysis uses the actual (subsidized) 
premium the representative farmer would pay (USDA-RMA 2002b).  The expected net 
indemnity is the expected difference between the indemnity and the premium.  Since the 
premium is nonrandom, the expected net indemnity is the expected indemnity minus the 
actual premium.  Because the integration required to calculate the expected indemnity is 
analytically intractable for the model, Monte Carlo integration is used to numerically 
estimate the expected indemnity (Greene, pp. 181-183).  Thus, the expected indemnity is 
the average indemnity for each policy over all states k: 
k
ijijijk CVGPEFI ),( .   
The per acre loan deficiency payment (LDP) for any crop j in state k is  
(3.7)   jkjkjjk ypMLRLDP }0,max{ −= , 
where MLRj is the marketing loan rate set for crop j.  The marketing loan rate guarantees 
a minimum price and so this program serves as price insurance without a premium.  The 
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marketing loan rate for this region in 2002 was $0.52/lb for cotton and $2.17/bu for 
sorghum (USDA-FSA 2002b). 
 
3.4.2. Prices, Yields, and Correlations 
The four-year county average yield and the four-year state average price from 
1997 to 2000 are used for the mean price and yield for each crop (USDA-NASS).  Mean 
yields are 677.0 lb/ac for cotton and 70.0 bu/ac for sorghum.  Because field level yield 
variability is greater than the variability of county average yield, the empirical analysis 
uses a yield standard deviation of 256.3 lb/ac for cotton and 19.96 bu/ac for sorghum, 
which are 1.5 times greater than for the county data.  These levels were chosen to be 
comparable to results from crop insurance studies (Coble, Zuniga, and Heifner).   
For cotton, the mean price is $0.51/lb, with a standard deviation of $0.08/lb.  For 
sorghum, the mean price is $1.98/bu, with a standard deviation of $0.41/bu.  APH price 
guarantees in 2002 were $0.50/lb for cotton and $1.85/bu for sorghum.  Base prices 
(futures price before planting) in 2002 for CRC were $0.42/lb for cotton and $2.18/bu 
for sorghum (USDA-RMA 2002a).  The base price was used for the CRC harvest price 
for both crops, since it is a commonly used estimate of the harvest price at planting time.  
The price of nitrogen ($0.20/lb), nitrogen application rates of 75 lbs/ac for cotton and 60 
lbs/ac for sorghum, and the variable costs of production ($316.40/ac for cotton and 
$116.70/ac for sorghum) are from crop budgets (Texas Cooperative Extension). 
USDA-NASS county average yield and state price data from 1982-2000 were 
used to estimate the price-yield variance-covariance matrix.  The respective correlation 
coefficients between own price and yield are –0.45 for cotton and –0.54 for sorghum.  
  
54 
 
However, since county data normally have higher correlation between price and yield 
than farm level data, we reduced the correlations by one-third and used an own price and 
yield correlation coefficient of –0.30 for cotton and –0.36 for sorghum, which are 
comparable to values reported by Coble, Heifner and Zuniga.  The correlation 
coefficient between cotton and sorghum prices is 0.43 and between cotton and sorghum 
yields is 0.56.  Lastly, the correlation coefficient between cotton yield and sorghum price 
is -0.30 and between sorghum yield and cotton price is -0.26.  
Cotton has a larger yield coefficient of variation, 37.9% versus 28.5% for 
sorghum, and sorghum has a larger price coefficient of variation, 20.9% versus 16.4% 
for cotton.  These coefficients of variation for price and yield are comparable to those 
reported by Coble, Zuniga, and Heifner using crop insurance data.  They report cotton 
yield coefficients of variation that range 32–61% and 22–25% for the cotton price.  
Following crop budgets, cotton seed proportionally increases cotton revenue by 12% 
(Texas Cooperative Extension).  When no risk management programs are used, cotton 
has the larger mean and standard deviation for income, $60.00/ac and $142.90/ac 
respectively, versus $29.30/ac and $40.60 respectively for sorghum, and so is generally 
considered riskier than sorghum.  
 
3.5. Crop Production Function 
Random crop yield follows a beta distribution with mean and variance that 
depend on applied nitrogen fertilizer.  The beta distribution is commonly used for crop 
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insurance analyses (Goodwin and Ker review several examples).  The beta density 
function for yield y is 
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where A is the minimum, B is the maximum, ν and γ are shape parameters, and Γ(⋅) is 
the gamma function (Evans, Hastings, and Peacock).   
As developed by Nelson and Preckel, the conditional beta density for crop yields 
requires the specification of the parameters ν and γ as functions of inputs such as 
fertilizer and either the estimation or imposition of values for the minimum and 
maximum.  Nelson and Preckel use Cobb-Douglas functions for the parameters ν and γ, 
but for the analysis here, the method described by Mitchell, Gray, and Steffey is used for 
the conditional beta density.  First the mean and variance of crop yield as functions of 
the fertilizer rate are specified, and then the implied functions for the parameters ν and γ 
are derived.   
For a crop yield following a beta density, the mean and variance are  
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Using a conditional beta density for crop yield requires specifying or estimating 
the mean yµ and the variance 2yσ  as functions of the nitrogen fertilizer rate, and then 
substituting these functions into equations (3.11) and (3.12) to obtain values for ν and γ.   
With this conditional distribution for yield, the farmer directly chooses the mean 
and the variance of the yield distribution when choosing the nitrogen fertilizer rate.  
With the Nelson and Preckel conditional yield distribution, the farmer’s choice of the 
nitrogen fertilizer rate also determines the mean and variance of the yield distribution, 
but the choice is indirect through the approximating functions used for the parameters ν 
and γ.   
For the analysis here, the functions for the dependence of the mean and variance 
of cotton yield on the nitrogen application rate were estimated using unpublished data 
from experiments conducted in 1999, 2001, and 2002 in Wharton County, Texas, near 
San Patricio County (McFarland).  Nitrogen fertilizer rates were experimentally varied 
from 0 to 150 lbs/acre and cotton lint yields measured for each plot for a total of 48 
observations.  Polynomial terms in the fertilizer rate were added successively for both 
the mean and variance until coefficient estimates were insignificant.  The final result was 
a quadratic equation for both the yield mean and the variance, with all estimated 
coefficients significant at the 1% level.   
The estimated coefficients were calibrated so that the optimal risk neutral 
nitrogen application rate matched that reported in crop budgets (Texas Cooperative 
Extension) and the associated mean and variance of yield matched the observed county 
data.  For the mean, this calibration primarily required changing the intercept term, and 
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then slightly changing the quadratic term to increase the curvature.  For the variance, 
only the intercept term was changed.  The final equations for the mean (µc) and variance 
(σc2) of cotton yield as a function of the nitrogen rate (xc) are  
(3.13)   µc = 63.5 + 16.25xc – 0.108xc2, 
(3.14)   σc2 = 12,500 + 453.6xc + 2.800xc2. 
Since experimental data were not available for sorghum, published estimates 
from Preckel, Loehman, and Kaylen for sorghum were calibrated in a similar manner so 
that again the optimal risk neutral nitrogen application rate matched that reported in crop 
budgets and the mean and variance of yield matched observed county data.  The final 
equations for the mean (µg) and variance (σg2) of sorghum yield as a function of the 
nitrogen rate (xg) are  
(3.15)   µg = 16.5 + 1.68xg – 0.013xg2,  
(3.16)   σg2 = 40.0 – 5.40xg + 0.400xg2 – 0.004xg3. 
 
3.5.1. Model Implementation 
The model was solved using the nonlinear program (NLP) solver or the simple 
branch and bound (SBB) solver in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System).  The 
optimal fertilizer rate was determined as an integer variable by specifying fertilizer rates 
in 0.1 lb/ac increments centered at the county mean for each crop.  Output was examined 
to ensure that the fertilizer rate on the boundary was never optimal.   
To draw yields from the beta distribution with the mean and variance implied by 
the fertilizer rate, GAMS was linked to Excel using the GDXXRW program distributed 
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with GAMS.  GAMS sends the required means and variances to Excel, then Excel 
generates appropriately correlated yields and prices using the method of Richardson and 
Condra.  This method begins with appropriately correlated uniform random variables, 
the inverse beta cumulative distribution function in Excel is used to obtain yields with a 
beta distribution and transformed normal random variables are used to obtain prices with 
a lognormal distribution.  Experimentation indicated that 5,000 random draws were 
needed for model results to stabilize.   
 
3.6. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the optimal fertilizer use, acreage allocation, and 
insurance coverage level when the current subsidized insurance is available.  Table 3.1 
reports results without the MLP and table 3.2 reports results with the MLP to indicate 
the effect of the MLP.  Results for the price election factor PEF are not reported since 
the optimum in all cases was the maximum available (100%).  
Table 3.1 shows that APH and CRC crop insurance both generally have a small 
positive effect on the optimal nitrogen fertilizer rate for both cotton and sorghum.  
Depending on the crop and the farmer’s level of risk aversion, the optimal rate increases 
about 1-2 lbs/ac, or 1-3%.  Crop insurance has a large effect on the optimal acreage 
allocation.  When APH is available, optimal cotton acreage more than doubles, 
accompanied by an appropriate decrease in sorghum acres.  When only CRC is available, 
the acreage effect is qualitatively the same, but much smaller—optimal cotton acreage  
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Table 3.1.  Optimal Farmer Choices without the Marketing Loan Program (MLP) 
 
     Moderately Risk Aversea     Highly Risk Aversea 
 Cotton Sorghum Cotton Sorghum 
Government Program -------- Optimal Nitrogen Fertilizer Rate (lbs/acre) ------- 
No Program 70.7 57.8 70.4 56.8 
APH onlyb 72.4 58.8 72.1 58.1 
CRC onlyc 72.1 58.6 72.0 57.7 
APH and CRCd 72.5 58.6 72.3 57.7 
Government Program ------------- Optimal Acreage Allocation (acre) ------------ 
No Program 561 1,139 295 1,281 
APH onlyb 1,164 536 678 1,023 
CRC onlyc 652 1,049 362 1,338 
APH and CRCd 1,134 566 651 1,049 
Government Program --------- Optimal Insurance Coverage Level (%) --------- 
No Program -- -- -- -- 
APH onlyb 70 70 70 70 
CRC onlyc 60 70 60 75 
APH and CRCd 70 70 70 75 
a
 Coefficients of absolute risk aversion are 4.0 x 10-6 and 7.0 x 10-6 for moderately and 
highly risk averse, respectively.   
b
 APH means the Actual Production History yield insurance. 
c
 CRC means the Crop Revenue Coverage revenue insurance. 
d
 Optimal choice when both insurance programs are available is APH for cotton and 
CRC for sorghum.   
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Table 3.2.  Optimal Farmer Choices with the Marketing Loan Program (MLP) 
 
     Moderately Risk Aversea   Highly Risk Aversea 
 Cotton Sorghum Cotton Sorghum 
Government Program ------- Optimal Nitrogen Fertilizer Rate (lbs/acre) ------- 
MLP onlyb 70.5 58.2 70.0 56.7 
APH and MLPc 71.8 59.2 71.3 58.3 
CRC and MLPd 71.8 59.1 71.9 58.3 
APH+CRC+MLPe 71.8 59.1 71.5 58.2 
Government Program ---------- Optimal Acreage Allocation (acre) ---------- 
MLP onlyb 569 1,131 265 1,435 
APH and MLPc 1,255 445 697 1,003 
CRC and MLPd 673 1,027 367 1,333 
APH+CRC+MLPe 1,230 470 678 1,022 
Government Program ------ Optimal Insurance Coverage Level (%) ------ 
MLP onlyb -- -- -- -- 
APH and MLPc 70 70 70 75 
CRC and MLPd 60 70 70 75 
APH+CRC+MLPe 70 70 70 75 
a
 Coefficients of absolute risk aversion are 4.0 x 10-6 and 7.0 x 10-6 for moderately and 
highly risk averse, respectively.   
b MLP means the Marketing Loan Program. 
c
 APH means the Actual Production History yield insurance. 
d
 CRC means the Crop Revenue Coverage revenue insurance. 
e
 Optimal choice when both insurance programs are available is APH for cotton and 
CRC for sorghum.   
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increases 16-23% depending on the level of risk aversion.  When both APH and CRC 
available, the optimal purchase is APH for cotton and CRC for sorghum, with a 70% 
coverage level for cotton APH and a 70% or 75% coverage level of CRC sorghum, 
depending on the farmer’s risk aversion.  When only CRC is available, it is optimal to 
purchase cotton CRC, but the optimal coverage level is relatively smaller than for APH.  
Comparing tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicates the effect of the Marketing Loan Program 
on optimal nitrogen fertilizer rates and acreage allocations.  The MLP decreases optimal 
nitrogen rates for cotton and increases optimal nitrogen rates for sorghum, but the effect 
is quite small, generally less than a 1% change.  The MLP increases cotton acres 1-9% 
depending on the program and farmer risk aversion, with an accompanying decrease in 
sorghum acres.  The only exception is the difference between the no program and MLP 
only cases, for which cotton acres decrease about 10%.  This case is different because 
for the no program case, it is optimal to plant only a total of 1575 acres for both crops, 
less than the 1700 available.  Once the MLP is available, it becomes optimal to plant 
1700 acres, with a net decrease in cotton acres.  Lastly, the MLP has no effect on 
insurance participation, except that the optimal coverage level for sorghum when only 
APH is available increases from 70% to 75%.  
The results in tables 3.1 and 3.2 also show that as farmer risk aversion increases, 
the optimal nitrogen rate decreases for all alternatives regardless of the crop because 
nitrogen is used as a risk increasing input in this study.  In addition, optimal cotton 
acreage decreases and optimal sorghum acreage increases, because cotton is the riskier 
crop.  For the range of risk aversion levels explored, the optimal insurance coverage 
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level did not change for cotton, but increased for sorghum.  To understand this result, 
table 3.3 reports the expected net indemnity (expected indemnity minus the premium) 
for each case.   
 
Table 3.3.  Expected Net Indemnity ($/acre) for Each Insurance Programa 
 
Coverage Level (%) 
Crop-Program 
55 60 65 70 75 80 85 
Cotton APHb 3.04 4.47 4.91 5.77 4.22 -0.90 -11.85 
Sorghum APHb 
-0.76 -0.61 -0.83 -0.91 -1.82 -- -- 
Cotton CRCc -1.77 -1.77 -3.19 -4.45 -8.67 -16.98 -31.58 
Sorghum CRCc 
-1.02 -0.74 -0.91 -0.77 -1.71 -- -- 
a
 Using a nitrogen application rate of 70 lbs/acre for cotton and 60 lbs/acre for sorghum. 
b
 APH means the Actual Production History yield insurance. 
c
 CRC means the Crop Revenue Coverage revenue insurance. 
 
 
Table 3.3 indicates that for cotton APH, the 70% coverage level has the largest 
expected net indemnity by a substantial amount and so is optimal over a wide range of 
risk aversion levels.  For sorghum APH, the expected net indemnity is always negative 
and fairly similar in value for many coverage levels.  Though the 60% coverage level 
has the highest expected net indemnity, the 70% coverage level is optimal over the range 
of risk aversion levels explored because the added risk benefit it provides exceeds the 
small decrease in the expected net indemnity.  For CRC for both crops, the optimal 
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coverage level is higher than the coverage with the largest expected net indemnity 
because again the added risk benefit exceeds the slight decrease in the net indemnity.   
The results in table 3.3 also explain the optimal choice of APH for cotton and 
CRC for sorghum when both insurance programs are available.  For cotton, APH has a 
positive expected net indemnity up to the 75% coverage level, while expected net 
indemnities are negative for CRC, indicating why APH is preferred to CRC.  Sorghum 
has negative expected net indemnities for all coverage levels for both programs, but 
expected net indemnities are largest for CRC, indicating why CRC is preferred to APH.  
These results are consistent with the actual farmer behavior in San Patricio County.  In 
2002, 98.6% of farmers in the county buying crop insurance for cotton bought APH and 
62.3% of those buying crop insurance for sorghum bought CRC (USDA-RMA 2002d).   
The magnitude and direction of intensive and extensive margin effects vary 
according to the crops and regions, largely depending on the effects of inputs such as 
fertilizer and specific crops on the variability of income.  In our study, the small positive 
effect of crop insurance on the intensive margin occurs for both crops and both APH and 
CRC.  This result is generally consistent with the econometric analysis of Horowitz and 
Lichtenberg, who report that crop insurance increases fertilizer use for corn in the 
Midwest.  However, Smith and Goodwin in their econometric study of wheat farmers in 
Kansas find that crop insurance decreases fertilizer use, as do Babcock and Hennessy in 
their simulation-based analysis of corn in Iowa.   
The difference between our findings and those of Babcock and Hennessy is 
largely due to the effect of nitrogen fertilizer on the variance of crop yield.  In the range 
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of the fertilizer rates that Babcock and Hennessy report, nitrogen is a variance 
decreasing input for corn, while for the rates in tables 3.1 and 3.2, nitrogen is a variance 
increasing input for cotton and sorghum in our study.  Regardless of the yield 
distribution, when crop insurance is available, farmers find it optimal to bear more risk 
and so choose fertilizer rates accordingly.  For the Babcock and Hennessy conditional 
yield distribution, this implies a reduction in the fertilizer rate.  For our conditional yield 
distributions, this implies an increase in the fertilizer rate.  However, focusing only on 
the variance effect of fertilizer on crop yields is a simplification of our analysis, since the 
farmer also simultaneously chooses the crop acreage allocation and insurance coverage 
levels.   
Our simulation-based results are generally consistent with the results of Wu’s 
econometric analysis of Nebraska corn-soybean farmers, since he finds that crop 
insurance increases fertilizer use and acreage of the riskier crop (corn).  Similarly, 
Chavas and Holt find that price supports (comparable to the Marketing Loan Program) 
create moderate acreage increases in the supported crop (corn) and that cross-commodity 
risk reductions are important to consider, much as we find.  Turvey’s method of analysis 
is similar to our method, but only focuses on acreage effects.  However, he finds that the 
Canadian crop insurance program increases optimal acreage devoted to riskier crops, just 
as we find for the U.S. insurance program.   
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Table 3.4 reports farmer certainty equivalents when implementing the optimal 
choices reported in tables 3.1 and 3.2.  From the farmer’s perspective, having all three 
federal risk management programs available is preferred—APH+CRC+MLP has the 
highest certainty equivalent regardless of the risk aversion level.  Relative to the no 
program case, these programs increase the farmer’s certainty equivalent 170-240% 
depending on the level of risk aversion.  About 2/3 of this increase is due to MLP and 
about 1/3 is due to crop insurance.  Also, the optimal farmer response for all scenarios 
examined is to change fertilizer use and crop acreage to increase the standard deviation 
of income (along with the mean).  These responses indicate that these risk management 
programs encourage farmers to bear more risk.   
Fixing the nitrogen fertilizer rate and endogenizing the acreage allocation, or 
fixing the acreage allocation and only endogenizing the nitrogen fertilizer rate, the bias 
that results from analyzing the intensive and extensive margin effects in isolation from 
one another, as opposed to simultaneously, can be determined.  Results are not reported, 
but the bias is rather small for this empirical example.  In general, the magnitude of both 
the intensive and extensive margin effects is larger when analyzed in isolation, as 
opposed to simultaneously.  This result is not surprising, since the farmer uses two 
instruments (both nitrogen fertilizer and crop acreage) to respond to changes in risk for 
the simultaneous case, but only one when the effects are examined in isolation.  
However, the magnitude of the resulting bias is not substantial for this empirical 
example—the optimal nitrogen fertilizer rate is 1-2 lbs/ac different and the crop acreage 
allocation is generally less than 5% different. 
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Table 3.4.  Certainty Equivalent and Mean and Standard Deviation of Profit 
($1,000’s) with Optimal Farmer Choices 
 
 
   Moderately Risk Aversea   Highly Risk Aversea 
Govt. Program Certainty 
Equivalent 
Mean 
Profit 
Standard 
Deviation 
Certainty 
Equivalent 
Mean 
Profit 
Standard 
Deviation 
No Program 32.7 54.7 104.9 20.6 41.4 77.3 
APH onlyb 48.4 85.4 144.1 32.5 62.2 98.2 
CRC onlyc 36.4 56.5 102.9 26.8 43.6 72.8 
APH and CRCd 48.9 84.1 140.4 34.2 60.2 92.2 
MLP onlye 68.1 95.6 115.5 52.6 80.6 87.4 
APH+MLP 88.0 135.6 162.0 67.8 103.8 106.9 
CRC+MLP 72.8 98.8 115.2 60.4 81.8 80.3 
APH+CRC+MLPd 88.4 134.3 158.9 69.2 102.8 103.1 
a
 Coefficients of absolute risk aversion are 4.0 x 10-6 and 7.0 x 10-6 for moderately and 
highly risk averse, respectively.   
b
 APH means the Actual Production History yield insurance. 
c
 CRC means the Crop Revenue Coverage revenue insurance. 
d Optimal choice when both insurance programs are available is APH for cotton and 
CRC for sorghum. 
e MLP means the Marketing Loan Program. 
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3.7. Conclusion 
To examine the effects of federal risk management programs on optimal nitrogen 
fertilizer use and land allocation to crops, this study developed a mathematical 
programming model of a representative cotton-sorghum farm in San Patricio County, 
Texas.  The model endogenizes nitrogen fertilizer rates and land allocation, as well as 
the insurance coverage levels, price election factors, and participation in insurance 
programs and the Marketing Loan Program (MLP).  This study uses direct expected 
utility maximizing non-linear programming in combination with a simulation approach.  
We assume a conditional beta distribution for crop yields, a lognormal distribution for 
crop prices, and impose historical correlations on yields and prices.   
Results show that with current crop insurance programs, the optimal nitrogen 
fertilizer rate slightly increases (1-3%) and the optimal cotton acreage substantially 
increases (16-129%).  The MLP only slightly changes optimal nitrogen fertilizer rates 
for both cotton and sorghum (less than a 1% change), but increases optimal cotton 
acreage an additional 1-9%.  These results depend crucially on the variance increasing 
effect of nitrogen fertilizer and of cotton in our model.  Other intensive and extensive 
margin responses would be optimal for other specifications for the stochastic revenue 
functions. 
Optimal participation in the available federal risk management programs includes 
using the MLP for both cotton and sorghum and purchasing APH insurance for cotton 
and CRC for sorghum.  Optimal coverage levels are 70% for cotton APH and 70% or 
75% corn sorghum CRC.  The optimal price election factor is always the maximum 
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available (100%).  The farmer’s expected net indemnity from these insurance programs 
largely explains the optimal insurance participation choices and coverage levels.  
Together, all three federal risk management programs increase farmer certainty 
equivalents 170-240%, of which about 1/3 is from crop insurance and 2/3 from the MLP.   
In general, the modeled farm responds optimally to these federal risk 
management programs by changing input use and crop acreage allocations to bear more 
risk.  The intensive and extensive margin effects of these and other federal programs 
have associated environmental effects that are being increasingly scrutinized since they 
can enhance or counteract the goals of other programs (Goodwin and Smith; Skees).  
Assuming the environmental effects of crop insurance and the MLP are positively 
related to nitrogen fertilizer use, both types of risk management programs imply negative 
environmental effects.  Crop insurance increases optimal nitrogen use through both the 
intensive and extensive margin effects.  The MLP increases optimal nitrogen use through 
the extensive margin effect, which dominates the slight decrease in optimal nitrogen use 
it creates for cotton.  The extensive margin effect of both types of programs is the 
dominant effect in our empirical analysis and of sufficient magnitude that it should 
probably be included in any comprehensive analysis of the environmental effects of 
federal policies.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RISK SHARING AND INCENTIVES WITH CROP INSURANCE AND 
EXTERNAL EQUITY FINANCING 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Farmers have several risk management alternatives available, such as crop 
insurance, futures and options, and government programs.  Among these subsidized crop 
insurance is widely adopted by farmers.  For instance, the Agricultural Risk Protection 
Act (ARPA) in 2000 greatly expanded the availability of crop insurance to farmers.  Not 
only have premium subsidies increased, but also the types of policies available and the 
crops that can be insured.  Thus the effect of crop insurance on risk management 
behaviors continues to be a pertinent issue.  By purchasing crop insurance, a farmer may 
change the risks he faces and this may affect production decisions depending on his risk 
attitudes and the fairness of insurance (Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian).  The most studied 
production decisions include land allocation and variable input use, especially nutrients 
and pesticides (Babcock and Hennessey; Horowitz and Lichtenberg; Smith and 
Goodwin).  To maintain focus on the effect of crop insurance on risk management 
behaviors, this paper only considers land allocation as a production decision. 
Crop insurance also affects the external equity investor who provides equity 
capital to the farmer, where external equity is procured from non-farmers or other 
sources that do not include owner equity such as retained earnings, gifts, off-farm 
income, and inheritance.  Arrangements such as land leases, partnerships and 
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corporations, and vertical integration have been the traditional channels through which 
farmers have obtained external equity.  Because crop insurance affect the external equity 
investor, the investor may require crop insurance or specify a certain level of coverage in 
the contract (Leatham, McCarl, and Richardson).  The investor also may want to adjust 
the contract design to reflect the farmer’s production decision and risk changes induced 
by the availability of crop insurance.  The contract should include the expected utility 
maximizing behavior of both the farmer and the investor under crop insurance.  Also, the 
contract should specify the risk sharing and economic incentives to induce the farmer’s 
best effort under crop insurance.  To better understand these relationships, we develop a 
principal-agent model of the contract between the external equity investor and the farmer 
when the farmer can purchase crop insurance.   
Many principal-agent models of sharecropping and crop insurance have been 
developed, primarily focused on the design of optimal contracts to prevent adverse 
selection and moral hazard (e.g. Canjels and Volz; Chambers; Nelson and Loehman; 
Skees and Reed; Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian; Raviv; Allen and Lueck).  Principal-agent 
models have also been used to analyze agricultural financing contracts (e.g., Wang, 
Leatham, and Chaisantikulawat; Santos).  Among many researchers, Wang, Leatham, 
and Chaisantikulawat studied risk sharing and incentives with external equity financing.  
However, they did not consider the effects of risk management tools such as crop 
insurance on financing contracts.  Unfortunately, no analysis of the effects of the 
government programs on contracts in agricultural production exists (Allen and Lueck).  
In this paper, external equity contracts between investors and farmers are modeled to 
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determine how the contracts should change when crop insurance is used in order to 
maintain equitable contracts.  
This study analytically examines the optimal contract between the investor and 
the farmer when crop insurance and external equity are available to the farmer.  This 
contract incorporates the production decision of farmers with crop insurance.  For the 
contract between the investor and the farmer, we assume a risk averse investor and a risk 
averse farmer with fair and unfair crop insurance, and use the case of no crop insurance 
for comparison.   
 
4.2. Principal-Agent Model of an External Equity Investor and a Farmer 
We develop a principal-agent model of the contractual relationship between an 
external equity investor and a farmer.  This model extends the work of Wang, Leatham, 
and Chaisantikulawat by assuming a risk averse investor and allowing the farmer to 
incorporate production decision and purchase crop insurance.   
An investor and a farmer share an investment cost for total acres M using 
external equity and owner equity.  The farmer’s share is δ and the investor provides the 
remainder (1 – δ), where 0 < δ < 1.  There are two crops, a risky crop and a safe crop, 
where the safe crop is assumed risk free.  Denoting investment in the risky crop as the 
acreage A, then the investment in the safe crop is M – A with per acre revenue r.  
Following Ashan, Ali, and Kurian, we define the revenue function R as  
(4.1) R = F(A) + r(M-A),  
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where F(⋅) is the revenue production function normalized by the price of the risky crop 
(F’ > 0 and F’’ < 0).  The risky crop’s yield is random, following a normal distribution 
with mean [ ( )]E F Aθ =  and variance 2 [ ( )]V F Aσ = , i.e. θ ∼ 2( , )N θ σ .  Thus revenue R 
is stochastic and also has a normal distribution with mean µ = E[F(A)] + r(M-A) and 
variance 2 [ ( )]V F Aσ = , i.e. R∼ 2( , )N µ σ  (Weninger and Just).  The means θ  and µ are 
increasing functions of risky crop acreage A, 0
A
θ∂
>
∂
 and 0
A
µ∂
>
∂
, at least up to the 
optimal level of risky crop acreage.  Also the variance 2σ  is assumed to be an increasing 
function of risky crop acreage A, 
2
0
A
σ∂
>
∂
.  However, 2σ  is assumed to be a decreasing 
function of crop insurance because crop insurance reduces downside risk.  We denote 
r(M-A) as ν for notational convenience.  To include effort e explicitly as a choice 
variable in equation (4.1), we follow the Linear-Exponential-Normal (LEN) model of 
Spremann, where effort linearly affects revenue.  Then the revenue production function 
is redefined as  
(4.2)    y = e + F(A) + r(M-A),   
where the farmer’s effort level e is a continuous choice variable for the farmer that 
affects the distribution of revenue.  For notation, denote the conditional probability 
density function for revenue as ( | )f y e .  The revenue distribution when the farmer 
exerts effort level e1 first order stochastically dominates the revenue distribution when 
the farmer exerts effort level e0 < e1.  The crop revenue is observable, but not the 
 73 
farmer’s effort, which creates a moral hazard problem that may include underreports of 
crop yield or quality, input use, and management times.  
Because effort causes disutility for the farmer, the farmer is willing to tradeoff 
effort and the associated shift in the revenue distribution.  However, because of the 
effect of effort on the revenue distribution, the investor prefers the farmer to exert higher 
effort, since effort has no direct cost to the investor.  To induce the farmer to exert the 
desired effort, the investor must create a contract that gives the farmer the correct 
incentive.  However, the contract can only compensate the farmer based on the 
observable revenue, not on the unobservable effort.  Denote this compensation as t(y), 
where y depends on the farmer’s effort level e, stochastic yield θ, and revenue ν for a 
safe crop. 
From the investment, the investor and the farmer’s payoff are proportional to 
revenue y minus the compensation t(y) to the farmer.  The investor and the farmer’s 
profit functions are 
(4.3) ( )(1 ) ( , , ) ( )p y e t ypi δ θ ν= − −  
(4.4) ( )( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )a y e t y t y c epi δ θ ν= − + − , 
where the subscripts p and a denote the investor (principal) and the farmer (agent), 
respectively, and c(e) denotes farmer’s effort cost function.  Following standard 
assumptions, we assume farmer’s effort cost function c(e) is separable from the utility 
function, where c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0 (Laffont and Martimort).  To ensure that the farmer is 
willing to take the contract, the investor must ensure that the farmer’s expected utility 
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with the contract equals or exceeds his reservation utility U , the expected utility from 
his next best option.  This participation or individual rationality constraint (IRC) is  
(4.5) ( ) ( | ) ( )a
y
U f y e dy c e Upi − ≥ .   
Since the farmer’s effort is unobservable, the investor must also ensure that the 
contract gives the farmer the incentive to exert the desired effort.  This incentive 
compatibility constraint (ICC) requires that if the farmer accepts the contract, his 
expected utility when exerting the best effort equals or exceeds his expected utility with 
any other effort levels.  Mathematically, this ICC can be expressed as follows:  
(4.6) arg max ( ) ( | ) ( )a
e y
U f y e dy c epi − .   
As specified, condition (4.6) cannot be implemented when solving the investor’s 
optimization problem.  The First Order Approach (Laffont and Martimort) is commonly 
used to replace this global condition with a local condition consisting of the first order 
condition for problem (4.6):  
(4.7)   '( ) ( | ) '( ) 0aa e
y
U f y e dy c e
e
pi
pi
∂
− =
∂
.   
Thus the investor’s problem is to find the contractual compensation t(y) and 
effort level e that maximize his expected utility V(⋅) of profit pip:  
(4.8)    
( ),
max   ( ) ( | )p
t y e
y
V f y e dypi , 
subject to the individual rationality constraint (4.5) and the incentive compatibility 
constraint (4.7).   
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We expand the model to include crop insurance so that the revenue with crop 
insurance Iy  depends on the farmer’s effort level e, stochastic revenue R, crop insurance 
indemnity ( , )I θ θ , and crop insurance premium ( , )p θ γ , where the indemnity depends 
on the guaranteed yield θ τθ=

 (τ: insurance coverage level) and stochastic yield θ, and 
premium ( , )p θ γ depends on the guaranteed yield and the per acre premium γ.  The 
normalized price is assumed as the expected price for yield shortfall as with the revenue 
production function.  The revenue with crop insurance is:  
(4.9) ( , , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )Iy e e R I pθ θ ν γ θ ν θ θ θ γ= + + −
  
, 
where ( , )I θ θ  is defined as ( max[( ),0]θ θ− ).  When crop insurance is actuarially fair, 
the insurance premium equals the expected indemnity, and when it is unfair, the 
insurance premium exceeds the expected indemnity: 
( , ) [ ( , )] ( ) ( )p E I f dθθ γ θ θ θ θ θ θ
−∞
≥ = −

  
. 
A farmer’s compensation scheme is assumed linear in revenue (Laffont and 
Martimort).  The investor pays a fixed payment w and a varying payment b that is 
proportional to revenue: t(y) = w + by.  Note that w can be negative, implying that the 
farmer may make some expenditure in addition to the investment share.  However, b 
must be positive, otherwise the farmer would have no incentive to exert any effort.  A 
convex quadratic function is used for the farmer’s effort cost function: c(e) = e2, 
implying increasing marginal disutility for effort.   
A constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function is used for both the 
investor and the farmer.  Since revenue without crop insurance has a normal distribution, 
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the investor’s profit also has a normal distribution.  In addition, since the compensation 
function is a linear transformation of revenue, the farmer’s profit also has a normal 
distribution.  As a result, both the investor’s and the farmer’s expected utility functions 
are equivalent to the mean variance models of their respective profits, Vp for the investor 
and Va for the farmer, respectively:  
(4.10) E[ ] 0.5 var( )p p p pV  α pi= −  
(4.11) E[ ] 0.5 var( )a a a aV  α pi= −  
where αp and αa are the coefficients of absolute risk aversion for the investor and farmer.   
 
4.3. Optimal Contract for External Equity Financing with Crop Insurance 
For the specified model, farmer profit is: 
(4.12) [ ] 2(1 ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )a b e R I p epi δ δ θ ν θ θ θ γ = + − + + − − 
 
.   
Based on the specified model with fair insurance, the mean and variance of 
farmer profit is then: 
(4.13) 2[ ] [ (1 ) ]( ) (1 )a fE b e w epi δ δ µ δ= + − + + − −  
(4.14) 2 2( ) [ (1 ) ]a fVar bpi δ δ σ= + − , 
where the subscript f denotes a risk averse farmer with fair insurance.  The variance is 
defined as 2 [ ( , )]f Var Iσ θ θ θ= +

, in which low revenues are truncated because fair crop 
insurance removes downside risk by 2[ ( , )] ( ) ( )V I f dθθ θ θ θ θ θ
−∞
= −

 
, where 
[ ( , )] 0V I θ θ
θ
∂
>
∂

 .  As a result, profit variance with crop insurance is less than without 
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crop insurance.  Also with the increase of insurance coverage level τ and thus the 
guaranteed level θ
 (=τθ ), the variance gets smaller, 
2
0f
σ
τ
∂
<
∂
, through 0θ
τ
∂
>
∂

 and 
[ ( , )] 0V I θ θ
θ
∂
>
∂

 .  If crop insurance is unfair such as ( , ) (1 ) [ ( , )]p E Iθ γ β θ θ= +   and fµ  
is fixed, where β is the insurance premium load (0 < β < 1) such as an administration 
cost for insurance company, then equation (4.13) decreases by [ (1 ) ] [ ( , )]b E Iβ δ δ θ θ+ −  .  
The variance with unfair insurance 2uσ  increases by 
2 [ ( , )]V Iβ θ θ  compared with 2fσ  in 
equation (4.14) through the decrease of indemnity, where the subscript u denotes a risk 
averse farmer with unfair insurance. 
Given the compensation parameters w and b along with actuarially fair insurance, 
the farmer chooses his effort and risky crop acreage to maximize his expected utility:  
(4.15) 2 2 2
,
max  [ (1 ) ]( ) (1 ) 0.5 [ (1 ) ]f a f
e A
b e w e bδ δ µ δ α δ δ σ+ − + + − − − + − . 
Solving the first order conditions for this problem gives the farmer’s optimal 
effort e*: 
(4.16) ])1([5.0* be δδ −+= . 
Denoting fµ  and 2fσ  as functions of A, we also get the optimal risky crop 
acreage A.  Rearranging the first order condition for A gives  
(4.17) 2[ '( )] [ (1 ) ] [ '( ) ( [ '( )], '( ))]f a f f fE F A r b V F A I E F A F Aα δ δ τ= + + − + ,  
where the second term in the right hand side is marginal risk premium (MRP), which is 
positive as long as τ < 1 (not full coverage), for an unit increase in risky crop acreage.  
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Thus the optimal risky crop acreage is determined at E[(F’(Af)] > r.  Compared with 
E[(F’(A0)] = r for a risk neutral farmer from Ashan, Ali, and Kurian, where the subscript 
0 denotes a risk neutral farmer, we get the relationship Af < A0 as long as τ < 1.  With 
the increase of insurance coverage level τ, MRP decrease and thus the optimal risk crop 
acreage increases.  In case of full insurance (τ = 1), MRP is zero, thus resulting in Af = 
A0 (Ashan, Ali, and Kurian).  Without crop insurance, MRP is greater than that with fair 
crop insurance, thus requiring An < Af, where the subscript n denotes a risk averse farmer 
without insurance.  Unfair insurance reduces the first term in the right hand side of 
(4.17) by [ ( [ '( )], '( ))]f fE I E F A F Aβ τ  and increases MRP by 
2 [ ( [ '( )], '( ))]f fV I E F A F Aβ τ , thus resulting in risky crop acreage Au < Af.  Also, if the 
decrease in the expected revenue dominates the decrease in the variance under unfair 
insurance compared with no insurance, the risky crop acreage is Au < An.  On the other 
hand, if the decrease in the variance dominates the expected revenue under unfair 
insurance compared with no insurance, then the risky crop acreage is Au > An.  For unfair 
insurance to be acceptable, the latter case is more appropriate, thus we assume Au > An.  
Then the optimal acreage ordering, A0 > Af > Au > An gives the following ordering for 
the revenue and variance: µ0 > µf > µu > µn and 2 2 2 20 n u fσ σ σ σ> > > , where the order of 
variance may change according to the size of the risk crop acreage and insurance 
coverage level.  In this study, we assume the difference of risky crop acreage is not so 
big and the insurance coverage level is high enough so that the above relationship is 
maintained.  The optimal risky crop acreage in (4.17) is too complicated to get the 
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analytical solution.  However, numerical solution can be obtained by risk attitude with 
and without crop insurance.  
Substituting this effort level into the individual rationality constraint (4.5) and 
solving for w gives:  
(4.18) ( ){ }* 2 21 [ (1 ) ] 0.25[ (1 ) ] * 1 21 f a fw U b bδ δ µ δ δ α σδ= − + − − + − −− . 
The investor’s optimal fixed compensation w increases with respect to the 
farmer’s reservation utility U  and decreases with respect to the farmer’s expected 
revenue and thus the risky crop acreage.  If the risk aversion parameter, aα , and variance 
term, 2fσ , are positive and small enough, the fixed compensation decreases with the 
introduction of crop insurance because it has an effect of decreasing risk, thus making 
( )21 2 a fα σ−  increase. 
The investor’s profit with crop insurance is:  
(4.19) (1 ) (1 )( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))p b e R I p wpi δ θ ν θ θ θ γ = − − + + − − 
 
. 
Based on the specified model, the mean and variance of the investor’s profit is: 
(4.20) ( ) (1 )[(1 )( ) ]p fE b e wpi δ µ= − − + −  
(4.21) 2 2 2( ) (1 ) (1 )p fVar bpi δ σ= − − . 
Expected profits with and without insurance are equal because the insurance is 
fair.  The variance depends on farmer’s risk attitude, the existence of crop insurance, the 
fairness of crop insurance, and insurance coverage level.  Substituting equations (4.20) 
and (4.21) into the investor’s objective in equation (4.10) and simplifying gives: 
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(4.22) 
( )
( ){ }2 2
2 2 2
(1 ) (1 ) 0.5[ (1 ) ]
[ (1 ) ] 0.25[ (1 ) ] * 1 2
0.5 (1 ) (1 )
f
f a fb
p f
b b
Max U b b
b
δ δ δ µ
δ δ µ δ δ α σ
α δ σ
  
− − + − +  	
 	
− − + − − + − −
 	
 	
− − − 	

 
. 
Solving the first order condition for b gives:  
(4.23) ( )( )
2
*
2
1 21
1 1 2( )
p f
a p f
b
α σ
δδ α α σ
 +
 = −
− + +  
.   
Using this result, several comparative static results can be obtained (table 4.1).  
The optimal variable compensation rate b* depends inversely on the farmer’s share of 
investment with decreasing rate: 
*
0bδ
∂
<
∂
.  This occurs because the greater the farmer’s 
share of the investment, the greater farmer’s incentive to exert effort.  The variable 
compensation rate b* decreases with the farmer’s risk aversion in increasing rate because 
the farmer needs to bear less risk: 
*
0
a
b
α
∂
<
∂
.  On the other hand, as the investor’s risk 
aversion increases, the variable compensation rate b* also increases, 
*
0
p
b
α
∂
>
∂
 at a 
decreasing rate, because the investor wants to share more risk with the farmer.  As the 
variance of revenue increases, the variable compensation rate b* decreases, 
*
2 0
f
b
σ
∂
<
∂
, 
because a smaller b* gives the farmer relatively less risk.  Thus overall, crop insurance 
leads to the increase in variable compensation because crop insurance reduces the risk by 
2
0f
σ
τ
∂
<
∂
.  Because of this effect of crop insurance, the investor must increase the 
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farmer’s risk share from the contract to motivate high effort.  In effect, crop insurance 
insulates the farmer from incentives to motivate high effort, so the investor compensates 
by increasing the variable compensation rate to increase the farmer’s risk share.  
Furthermore, we know that the variable compensation rate increases with an increase in 
the insurance coverage level, 
*
0b
τ
∂
>
∂
, because 
2
0f
σ
τ
∂
<
∂
 and 
*
2 0
f
b
σ
∂
<
∂
. 
Substituting the optimal b* into equations (4.15) and (4.16) gives the optimal w* 
and e*:   
(4.24) ( )( )
2
*
2
1 2
0.5
1 2( )
p f
a p f
e
α σ
α α σ
 +
 =
+ +  
 
(4.25)
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
22 2
* 2
2 2
1 2 1 21 0.25 1 2(1 ) 1 2( ) 1 2( )
p f p f
f a f
a p f a p f
w U
α σ α σ
µ α σδ α α σ α α σ
    + +
  	  	= − − −
  	  	
− + + + +
  
  
. 
Again, several comparative static results can be obtained (table 4.1).  The optimal 
level of effort increases with the investor’s risk aversion and decreases with the farmer’s 
risk aversion and the variance of revenue: 
*
0
p
e
α
∂
>
∂
, 
*
0
a
e
α
∂
<
∂
, and 
*
2 0
f
e
σ
∂
<
∂
.  Because 
the farmer’s compensation with crop insurance is highly dependent on revenue, the 
farmer must exert more effort relative to the case without insurance.  Also the insurance 
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coverage level increases the optimal level of effort, 
*
0e
τ
∂
>
∂
, because 
2
0f
σ
τ
∂
<
∂
 and 
*
2 0
f
e
σ
∂
<
∂
. 
The optimal level of the fixed compensation w decreases with the investor’s risk 
aversion 
*
0
p
w
α
∂
<
∂
.  This means that the risk averse investor wants to share more risk 
with the farmer, and thus decreases the fixed compensation.  The optimal level of the 
fixed compensation increases with the variance of revenue 
*
2 0
f
w
σ
∂
>
∂
, resulting in the 
decrease with the insurance coverage level, 0w
τ
∂
<
∂
, because 
2
0σ
τ
∂
<
∂
 and 
*
2 0
f
w
σ
∂
>
∂
.  It 
also increases with the farmer’s risk aversion 
*
0
a
w
α
∂
>
∂
.  Thus the investor needs to 
increase the fixed compensation to induce the participation of the risk averse farmer in 
the contract.  The optimal level of fixed compensation also increases with the farmer’s 
investment share 
*
0wδ
∂
>
∂
 in increasing rate.  The farmer with high investment share 
would be willing to exert effort, thus the investor increases fixed compensation instead 
of variable compensation.  Similarly, the optimal level of fixed compensation increases 
with the farmer’s reservation utility, 
*
0w
U
∂
>
∂
, and decreases with expected revenue, 
*
0
f
w
µ
∂
<
∂
.  Crop insurance leads to increase the optimal level of effort through the  
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Table 4.1. Comparative Static Results of the External Equity Financing with Crop 
Insurance on Optimal Level of Effort e*, Variable Compensation b*, and Fixed 
Compensation w*a 
 
          First Derivative     Second Derivative 
 Derivative Sign Derivative Sign 
Effect of investment share δ on 
variable compensation b* 
*b
δ
∂
∂
 
– 
2 *
2
b
δ
∂
∂
 
– 
Effect of farmer’s risk aversion 
αa on variable compensation b* 
*
a
b
α
∂
∂
 
– 
2 *
2
a
b
α
∂
∂
 + 
Effect of investor’s risk aversion 
αp on variable compensation b* 
*
p
b
α
∂
∂
 + 
2 *
2
p
b
α
∂
∂
 
– 
Effect of coverage level τ on 
variable compensation b* 
* * 2
2
b b σ
τ σ τ
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂ ∂
 
+ 
2 *
2
b
τ
∂
∂
 
?b 
Effect of investor’s risk aversion 
αp on effort level e* 
*
p
e
α
∂
∂
 + 
2 *
2
p
e
α
∂
∂
 
– 
Effect of farmer’s risk aversion 
αa on effort level e* 
*
a
e
α
∂
∂
 
– 
2 *
2
a
e
α
∂
∂
 + 
Effect of coverage level τ on 
effort level e* 
* * 2
2
e e σ
τ σ τ
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂ ∂
 
+ 
2 *
2
e
τ
∂
∂
 
?b 
Effect of investor’s risk aversion 
αp on fixed compensation w* 
*
p
w
α
∂
∂
 
– 
2 *
2
p
w
α
∂
∂
 ?b 
Effect of coverage level τ on 
fixed compensation w* 
* * 2
2
w w σ
τ σ τ
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂ ∂
 
– 
2 *
2
w
τ
∂
∂
 
?b 
Effect of farmer’s risk aversion 
αa on fixed compensation w* 
*
a
w
α
∂
∂
 + 
2 *
2
a
w
α
∂
∂
 ?b 
Effect of investment share δ on 
fixed compensation w* 
*w
δ
∂
∂
 
+ 
2 *
2
w
δ
∂
∂
 
+ 
Effect of reservation utility U on 
fixed compensation w* 
*w
U
∂
∂
 
+ 
2 *
2
w
U
∂
∂
 
nac 
Effect of expected revenue µ on 
fixed compensation w* 
*w
µ
∂
∂
 – 
2 *
2
w
µ
∂
∂
 nac 
a
 More detailed comparative static are given in appendix C 
b
 The effect is uncertain.   
c
 Not available 
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increase in variable compensation, and decreases the optimal level of fixed 
compensation.  Thus it induces more risk sharing between the investor and the farmer.  
 
4.4. Empirical Analysis 
For empirical analysis, we review similar contract types to our model and then 
develop a representative farm to apply our model to see the effect of crop insurance on 
the contract change.  One example is a joint venture in mid-west region in the United 
State, where there are ten investors and two operating managers (farmers) who also are 
investors.  Both farmers can choose any crop they want and each are paid with the fixed 
compensation of $60,000/year and variable compensation of 5% for prices and 
production yields that exceed county averages.  After payment to the farmers, the 
investors share the profits according to the share of the 12,000 total acres they personally 
contributed.  Another example is a joint venture in Canada.  This joint venture consists 
of five investors and three managers, where one manager is an investor.  Managers can 
choose any crop and receive a base salary of $60,000/year for each but do not have any 
variable compensation.  The remaining net farm income is distributed to the investors 
based on the percentage of the 15,500 total tillable acres that each investor contributed.  
These contracts were chosen because they match the external equity financing contracts 
modeled in this study and can be used to help quantify the effect of crop insurance on the 
contract terms for similar kinds of contracts. 
The joint ventures considered are private and detailed information about them is 
not available.  Thus, we developed data for a representative farming situation in San 
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Patricio County, Texas, near Corpus Christi.  The representative farm grows cotton and 
grain sorghum, where cotton is riskier crop than sorghum in terms of income.  Cotton 
has a mean income of $60.0 per acre with standard deviation of $142.9 and sorghum has 
a mean income of $29.3 per acre with standard deviation of $40.6 (Seo, Mitchell, and 
Leatham).  Total acreage is 1,700 acre that is available for both crops.  The 
representative farmer is assumed to share 50% of the investment cost for total acres and 
has a reservation utility of $60,000/year based on the two examples above.  
Seo, Mitchell and Leatham estimated that a moderate risk averse representative 
farmer would allocate 700 acres to cotton production and 1,000 acres to sorghum 
production if crop insurance was unavailable.  They also estimated that the 
representative farmer would choose to plant 1,100 acres of cotton and 600 acres if the 
crops are insured at the 85% coverage level.   
Given the information for the representative farm above, table 4.2 shows the 
optimal levels of effort, variable compensation rate, and fixed compensation rate.  Also 
table 4.2 provides how each parameter including investor’s risk aversion parameter, 
farmer’s risk averse parameter, insurance coverage level, investment share, and 
reservation utility affects the optimal level of effort, variable compensation rate, and 
fixed compensation rate.  Given the parameters, the variable compensations without and 
with crop insurance are 0.44% and 0.48% of total revenue before paying base salary in 
earlier empirical examples (fixed compensation in our model), respectively, and the 
fixed compensations are $48,404 and $36,030, respectively.  From these results, we 
know that crop insurance increases the variable compensation and decrease the fixed 
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compensation.  Also, crop insurance increases the farmer’s effort level.  However, their 
magnitudes depend on the parameters selected.   
When the principal’s risk aversion increases from moderately risk averse level of 
4 × 10-6 to highly risk averse level of 7 × 10-6, the variable compensation and effort level 
increase and the fixed compensation decreases in both cases, which are consistent with 
the signs reported earlier (table 4.1).  This is because the risk averse investor wants to 
share more risk with the farmer.  However, the magnitude of change is greater in the 
case with crop insurance because the investor knows that the farmer with crop insurance 
can bear more risk as a result of buying crop insurance.  When the farmer’s risk aversion 
parameter increases, the opposite results are obtained compared with the case of 
principal’s risk aversion parameter change.   
When the insurance coverage level decreases from the highest of 85% to the 
lowest of 50%, the variable compensation decreases by 0.11 percentage points and the 
fixed compensation increases by $98/year.  Crop insurance increases the farm capacity 
to bear more risk and the incentive to moral hazard so that the higher coverage level 
increases the variable compensation and decreases the fixed compensation.  That is, if 
the farmer buys crop insurance, then he/she would be willing to share more risk with the 
investor and be induced to moral hazard than before he/she buys crop insurance.  Thus 
the risk averse investor increases the variable compensation to share more risk with the 
farmer and to reduce moral hazard when the farmer buys crop insurance.  When the 
investment share of the farmer decreases by 20%, the variable compensation increases 
by 28.4 percentage points in both cases of without and with crop insurances and fixed 
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compensation decreases by $13,830 with no insurance and by $10,294 with crop 
insurance, which are consistent with the signs reported earlier (table 4.1).  This is 
because the higher the investment share of the farmer, the farmer is willing to effort to 
secure his portion of investment.  Thus the investor does not need to give a high 
incentive but secure the farmer’s reward from the investment by guaranteeing high fixed 
compensation.   
As the reservation utility decreases by $15,000/year, the principal decreases only 
the fixed compensation by $30,000 in both cases of without and with crop insurances.  
This large amount of change is found in equation (4.25), where the fixed compensation 
is doubled from the investment share of 50%.  In summery, crop insurance increases the 
variable compensation and thus the farmer’s effort level and decreases the fixed 
compensation.  And it’s effect gets higher as the insurance coverage level and the risk 
aversion parameter increase.   
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Table 4.2. Sensitivity Analysis of Selected Variables on Optimal Level of Effort e*, 
Variable Compensation b*, and Fixed Compensation w*  
 
   Without Crop Insurance    With Crop Insurance Parameters 
e
*
 b* w*($/yr) e* b* w*($/yr) 
Investor's Risk Aversion       
4 × 10-6 0.2511 0.0044 48,404 0.2512 0.0048 36,030 
7 × 10-6 0.2520 0.0081 48,140 0.3188 0.2753 13,433 
       
Farmer's Risk Aversion       
4 × 10-6 0.2511 0.0044 48,404 0.2512 0.0048 36,030 
7 × 10-6 0.2502 0.0006 48,670 0.1829 -0.2683 58,854 
       
Insurance Coverage Level       
85% 0.2511 0.0044 48,404 0.2512 0.0048 36,030 
50% 0.2511 0.0044 48,404 0.2509 0.0037 36,128 
       
Investment Share       
50% 0.2511 0.0044 48,404 0.2512 0.0048 36,030 
30% 0.2511 0.2888 34,574 0.2512 0.2892 25,736 
       
Reservation Utility ($/yr)       
60,000 0.2511 0.0044 48,404 0.2512 0.0048 36,030 
45,000 0.2511 0.0044 18,404 0.2512 0.0048 6,030 
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4.5. Conclusion 
Farmers have several risk management programs such as crop insurance, futures 
and options, and government programs.  Among these, subsidized crop insurance is 
widely adopted by the farmer.  By purchasing crop insurance, a farmer may change the 
risks both the farmer and the investor face and this may affect production decisions 
depending on his risk attitudes and the fairness of insurance (Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian).  
Thus, an investor that provides external equity to a farmer also may want to adjust the 
investment contract design to reflect farmer’s production decision and risk changes 
induced by the availability of crop insurance. 
To better understand these relationships, we developed a principal-agent model 
of the contract between the external equity investor and the farmer when the farmer can 
purchase crop insurance.  This study examines how the optimal contract design that 
induces the best effort from the farmer using a variable compensation rate and a fixed 
compensation rate is altered by the presence of crop insurance.  We use the principal 
agent model to solve the issue, where the principal is the agricultural investor who 
provides external equity to a farmer and the agent is the farmer who makes production 
decisions such as land allocation and input use in addition to providing internal equity.   
The results show that the investor’s optimal contract with crop insurance 
employs a larger variable compensation rate than it does without insurance.  This is 
because crop insurance reduces the risk farmers faced, thus allowing the farmer to bear 
more risk.  Thus the larger variable compensation rate gives more incentive for the 
farmer to work harder.  The variable compensation rate also increases with the crop 
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insurance coverage level.  The optimal contract with fair insurance uses a larger variable 
compensation rate than unfair insurance, where fair insurance means that the expected 
indemnity is equal to the insurance premium while unfair insurance means that the 
expected indemnity is less than insurance premium.  The farmer can reduce more risk by 
buying fair insurance and thus can bear more risk.  This leads to a larger variable 
compensation rate compared with unfair insurance.  This shows an implication that when 
the government subsidy increases, the risk sharing increases through the increase in 
variable compensation.  The risk averse investor prefers that the optimal contract depend 
more on variable compensation than the risk neutral investor because the risk averse 
investor prefers to share more risk with farmer than the risk neutral investor.  The risk 
averse farmer is given a smaller variable compensation rate than the risk neutral farmer.  
This is because the risk averse farmer would not take many risks and thus prefers a fixed 
compensation rate instead of a variable compensation rate.  
The optimal contract with crop insurance requires the farmer to bear more risk 
compared with no crop insurance so that the farmer has the appropriate incentives to 
work hard.  Thus by making the compensation scheme depend more on variable 
compensation when crop insurance is used, the investor may induce more effort from the 
farmer and share more risk with the farmer.  On the other hand, the farmer who buys 
crop insurance to reduce risk may have an additional risk caused by the adjustment of a 
contract with the investor.  However, the farmer is compensated with the increased 
variable compensation. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Agricultural producers face uncertain agricultural production and market 
conditions.  This uncertainty makes agricultural income unstable.  Much of the 
uncertainty faced by agricultural producers cannot be controlled by the producer but can 
be managed.  Several risk management approaches are available in the U.S. to help 
manage uncertainties in agricultural production, marketing, and finance.  Two widely 
adopted risk management programs are crop insurance and marketing loan programs 
provided by the federal government.   
These risk management programs reduce downside risk faced by the farmer.  
Program provisions also affect crop returns and thus farm investment and production 
decisions as well as agricultural contracts.  For instance, farmers may be induced to 
grow crops that use more nitrogen, herbicides, and insecticides with possible detrimental 
effect on the environment.  Risk management programs also may encourage or 
discourage investment in perennial crops.  It may lead to existing farmers to stay in 
farming longer or leave earlier.  Crop Insurance may alter agricultural contracts.  Thus 
the impacts that these decisions have need to be considered by policy makers and farm 
decision makers. 
This study focuses on the farm level economic implications of the federal risk 
management programs.  Specifically the work focuses on the impacts that crop insurance 
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and marketing loan programs that protect farmers from yield, income, and price 
uncertainties have on investment, production, and contract design. 
The first essay sets up a real option model with crop insurance and investigates 
the effect that crop (revenue) insurance has on the entry threshold as an investment 
criterion and exit threshold as a disinvestment criterion.  For the application, we choose 
table grape production in California that accounts for 90% of domestic grape production 
(USDA-ERS). 
The results show that revenue insurance with actual (subsidized) insurance 
premium decreases the entry and exit thresholds compared with no revenue insurance.  
Thus the revenue insurance encourages both the investment and current farming 
operation.  Increasing insurance premium rate increases both the entry and exit threshold, 
thus discouraging the investment and current farming operation.  This implies that an 
increase in the subsidy rate, that decreases the insurance premium rate, results in the 
encouragement of grape production investment and current grape farming operations.  
On the other hand, given the insurance premium rate, the insurance policy with high 
revenue guarantee above the exit threshold has a stronger effect on the exit threshold as 
well as the entry threshold than with low revenue guarantee.  This implies that if a policy 
goal is to induce more farmers in a certain crop, the insurance policy with higher 
coverage level is more effective. 
In the second essay, we examine the effects of federal risk management programs 
on optimal nitrogen fertilizer use and land allocation to crops.  To do this we developed 
a mathematical programming model of a case cotton-sorghum farm in San Patricio 
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County, Texas.  The model endogenizes nitrogen fertilizer rates and land allocation, as 
well as the insurance coverage levels, price election factors, and participation in 
insurance programs and the Marketing Loan Program (MLP).  In particular we use direct 
expected utility maximizing non-linear programming in combination with a simulation 
approach. 
We find that the optimal participation in the available crop insurance and the 
MLP includes using the MLP for both cotton and sorghum and purchasing APH 
insurance for cotton and CRC for sorghum.  Chosen optimal coverage levels are 70% for 
cotton APH and 70% or 75% corn sorghum CRC.  The optimal price election factor is 
always the maximum available (100%).  The farmer’s expected net indemnity from these 
insurance programs largely explains the optimal insurance participation choices and 
coverage levels.  Together, all three federal risk management programs increase farmer 
certainty equivalents 170-240%, of which about 1/3 is from crop insurance and 2/3 from 
the MLP.   
Results also show current crop insurance program increases optimal nitrogen 
fertilizer rate (1-3%) and optimal cotton acreage (16-129%).  The MLP only slightly 
changes optimal nitrogen fertilizer rates for both cotton and sorghum (less than a 1% 
change), but increases optimal cotton acreage an additional 1-9%.   
In general, farmers respond optimally to these federal risk management programs 
by changing input use and crop acreage allocations to bear more risk.  They are 
associated with environmental effects that are being increasingly scrutinized since they 
can enhance or counteract the goals of other programs (Goodwin and Smith; Skees).  
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Assuming the environmental effects of crop insurance and the MLP are positively 
related to nitrogen fertilizer use, both types of risk management programs imply negative 
environmental effects.   
The third essay examines how optimal contract design that induces the best effort 
from the farmer using a variable compensation rate and a fixed compensation rate is 
altered by the presence of crop insurance.  We use the principal agent model to examine 
this, where the principal is the agricultural investor who provides the external equity to 
the farmer and the agent is the farmer who makes production decisions such as land 
allocation and input use.   
The results show that the investor’s optimal contract with crop insurance 
employs a larger variable compensation rate than it does without insurance.  This is 
because crop insurance reduces the risk farmers face, thus increasing the farm capacity 
to bear more risk.  Thus, the larger variable compensation rate gives more incentive for 
the farmer to work harder.  The variable compensation rate also increases with the 
coverage level because the higher coverage level increases the farm capacity to bear risk.  
The optimal contract with fair insurance uses a larger variable compensation rate than 
unfair insurance, where fair insurance means that the expected indemnity is equal to the 
insurance premium while unfair insurance means that the expected indemnity is less than 
insurance premium.  The farmer can reduce more risk by buying fair insurance and thus 
can increases the farm capacity to bear more risk.  This leads to a larger variable 
compensation rate compared with unfair insurance.  This implies that when the 
government subsidy increases, the risk sharing increases through the increase in variable 
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compensation.  The risk averse investor prefers that the optimal contract depends more 
on variable compensation than the risk neutral investor because the risk averse investor 
prefers to share more risk with farmer than the risk neutral investor.  The risk averse 
farmer is given a smaller variable compensation rate than the risk neutral farmer.  This is 
because the risk averse farmer would not take many risks and thus prefers a fixed 
compensation rate instead of a variable compensation rate.  
The optimal contract with crop insurance requires the farmer to bear more risk 
compared with no crop insurance so that the farmer has the appropriate incentives to 
work hard.  Thus by making the compensation scheme depend more on variable 
compensation when crop insurance is used, the investor may induce more effort from the 
farmer and share more risk with the farmer.   
Collectively this study investigates the effect of federal risk management 
programs on the investment, production decisions, and contract design.  Results show 
that risk management programs, especially crop insurance, affect farmer’s decision-
makings and also investor’s contract design.  We suggest the farmer to consider the 
irreversibility and uncertainty when making investment decision by adopting real option 
approach because both conditions produce the option values of waiting, thus changing 
the entry and exit decisions compared with NPV approach.  Also crop insurance must be 
considered because it affects the entry and exit thresholds by reducing risks faced by the 
farmer.  We also suggest that the simultaneous decision making with crop insurance 
need to be adopted in production decisions for the optimal input allocation and optimal 
choice of insurance parameters.  Also the effects of federal risk management programs 
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on environment need to be considered because those programs may counteract the 
environment programs.  Finally, the agricultural investor needs to adjust the agricultural 
contract design to induce the farmer’s best effort in farming under crop insurance.  In 
addition, the policy maker needs to consider the farmer’s decision-making behavior 
when designing and delivering risk management programs. 
This dissertation has several limitations.  First of all, this dissertation mainly 
focuses on crop insurance and the LDP as federal risk management programs.  However, 
more federal risk management programs are available to the farmer, such as counter 
cyclical payment program, conservation reserve program, and nonrecourse marketing 
assistance loan program.  Also other risk management programs are provided in private 
sector, such as the futures and options.  Those programs may works as complements or 
substitutes each other.  For better understanding of the effect of the risk management 
programs on farmer decision-making, more risk management programs must be 
considered in the analyses.   
Second, our results are specific to crops and regions.  The numeric results 
definitely change by crops and regions.  Especially, the results from second essay may 
be reversed according to regions as shown by Horowitz and Lichtenberg and Smith and 
Goodwin.  Thus to apply this results to other regions and crops need a caution.  More 
extended empirical studies by regions and crops are needed in the future. 
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A.1. Mathematics for Real Options1 
Appendix A includes the mathematics for real option used in the text and derive 
the entry and exit model based on the mathematics.  This section also includes the 
intuitive explanations of the entry and exit decisions in a competitive industry and data 
used in the chapter II. 
 
A.1.1. The Wiener Process (Brownian Motion) 
A Wiener process dz, a continuous-time stochastic process, is defined as  
(A.1)   tdz dtε= , 
where εt is a normally distributed random variable with εt ∼N(0, 1) and dt is a small time 
increment.  The expected value and variance of the Wiener process are E(dz) = 0 and 
V(dz)=E[(dz)2]=dt, respectively.  However, the Wiener process has no time derivative 
because dz/dt = εt(dt)-1/2 that approaches to infinity as dt approaches to zero. 
When two Wiener processes are considered, we can write E(dz1dz2)=γ 12dt, where 
γ12 is the correlation coefficient between the two processes. 
 
A.1.1.1. Brownian Motion with Drift 
In more general form, the Brownian motion with drift of a continuous stochastic 
process x is 
(A.2)   dx = α dt + σ dz, 
                                                 
1
 Most mathematics is cited from Dixit and Pindyck. 
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where α is called  the drift rate and σ the volatility rate.  Given the Wiener process in 
(A.1), the change in x, denoted by ∆x, is normally distributed over any time interval t, 
and has expected value E(x) = α ∆t and variance V(x) = σ2∆t, where the variance 
increases with the time. 
 
A.1.2. Generalized Brownian Motion – Ito Process 
A continuous time stochastic process x(t) in equation (A.2) can be expressed as a 
general form, called Ito process.    
(A.3)   dx = a(x,t)dt + b(x,t) dz, 
where the drift rate a(x,t) and volatility rate b(x,t) of the Ito process are known 
(nonrandom) functions with current state x and time t.  In equation (A.3), the expected 
value and variance of the random process x are E(dx) = a(x,t)dt and V(dx) = E[dx2] – 
(E[dx]2) = b2( x,t) dt.   
 
A.1.2.1. Geometric Brownian Motion 
A geometric Brownian motion with drift in equation (A.4) is an important special 
case of the Ito process from equation (A.3). 
(A.4)   dx = α x dt + σ x dz. 
From equation (A.1) and equation (A.2), we know that the percentage changes in x, ∆x/x, 
are also normally distributed.  Because these are changes in the natural logarithm of x, 
absolute changes in x, ∆x, are lognormally distributed. 
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A.1.3. Ito’s Lemma 
We need to use differentials to solve the functions with Ito process in real options.  
However, the Ito process in equation (A.3) is not differentiable even though it is 
continuous in time.  Ito’s Lemma can be used to differentiate or integrate functions of Ito 
processes. 
Let’s consider a function F(x,t), where x(t) is an Ito process.  A Taylor series 
expansion produces 
(A.5)  
2 3
2 3
2 3
1 1( ) ( ) ......
2 6
F F F FdF dx dt dx dx
x t x x
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
. 
The higher order terms beyond (dt)2 and (dx)3 in equation (A.5) vanish in the limit.  
However, the second order term (dx)2 does not vanish unlike ordinary calculus.  For the 
proof, by inserting dx in equation (A.3) into (dx)2, we have  
(A.6)  (dx)2 = a2(x,t) (dt)2 + 2a(x,t)b(x,t)(dt)3/2 + b2(x,t)dt, 
where the terms (dt)3/2 and (dt)2 go to zero faster than dt in the limit but b2(x,t)dt remains 
in the formula.  Thus we have the following differential equation dF from Ito’s Lemma. 
(A.7)  
2
2
2
1 ( )
2
F F FdF dx dt dx
x t x
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂
. 
By inserting dx from equation (A.3) into equation (A.7), we have  
(A.8)  
2
2
2
1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2
F F F FdF a x t b x t dt b x t dz
t x x x
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
. 
We can extend the differential equation with m Ito processes, where  
(A.9)  dxi = ai(x1, ….. , xm, t)dt + bi(x1, ….. , xm, t)dzi,  i = 1, ….. , m, 
with E(dzidzj)=γ ijdt.  Then we have the differential dF by Ito’s Lemma as 
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(A.10)  
21
2i i ji i ji i j
F F FdF dt dx dx dx
t x x x
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
. 
By replacing dx with equation (A.3), we have the expanded form of differential dF as  
(A.11)  
2
2
1 1 2
1[ ( ,...., ) ( ,...., )
2i ii ii i
F F FdF a x t b x t
t x x
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
2
1 1 1
1 ( ,...., ) ( ,...., ) ] ( ,...., )
2 ij i j i ii j ii j i
F Fb x t b x t dt b x t dz
x x x
γ
≠
∂ ∂
+ +
∂ ∂ ∂ 
. 
 
A.1.4. Derivation of Geometric Brownian Motion of Revenue 
Consider the function F(p,y) = R = py, where R is revenue, p is price and y is 
yield.  If price and yield follow geometric Brownian motion, uncertainty of price p and 
yield y can be expressed as 
(A.12)   dp = αppdt + σppdzp 
(A.13)   dy = αyydt + σyydzy, 
where dp and dy are the changes in price and yield and E(dzpdzy) = γpydt.  α is the drift 
rate, σ is the volatility rate, dt is the small change in time, and dz is the increment of 
Wiener process.  Given R = py, we get ∂ R/∂ t = 0, ∂ 2R/∂p2 = ∂ 2R/∂y2 = 0, and ∂2R/∂p∂y 
= 1.  Then equation (A.14) is obtained from equation (A.7). 
(A.14)   dR = p dy + y dp + dp dy. 
By replacing dp and dy with equation (A.12) and (A.13), respectively, we have 
(A.15)  dR = (αp + αy + γpyσpσy) Rdt + σpRdzp + σyRdzy. 
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Equation (A.15) has the same form as equation (A.12) and (A.13) so that we know 
revenue also follows the geometric Brownian motion when both the price and yield 
follow geometric Brownian motions.   
When we assume r = log R = log (py), we obtain ∂ r/∂ t = 0, ∂ r/∂p = 1/p, ∂ r/∂y 
= 1/y and ∂ 2r/∂p2 = - 1/p2, ∂ 2r/∂y2 = - 1/y2, and ∂ 2r/∂p∂y = 0.  Then we get the 
equation (A.16) from equation (A.7). 
(A.16)   2 22 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
dr dp dy dp dy
p y p y
= + − − . 
By replacing dp and dy with equation (A.12) and (A.13), respectively, we have 
(A.17)   2 21 1( )
2 2p y p y p p y y
dr dt dz dzα α σ σ σ σ= + − − + + . 
Equation (A.17) has the same form as equation (A.2) so that we know the change in 
logarithm of revenue also follows a simple Brownian motion.  Over the small time 
interval dt, it is normally distributed with mean 2 21 1( )
2 2p y p y
dtα α σ σ+ − −  and variance 
2 2( 2 )p y py p y dtσ σ γ σ σ+ + . 
 
A.1.5. Derivation of the Entry and Exit Threshold Model in a Competitive Industry 
The value of a farm is a function of stochastic revenue and state variable that is 
either active (1) or inactive (0).  We denote the values of the inactive and active farms as 
V0(R) and V1(R), respectively.  First consider the inactive farm.  In equilibrium, the 
expected rate of capital gain of the value of the investment opportunity E[dV0(R)] should 
equal the total expected return on the investment opportunity ρV0(R)dt.  
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(A.18)    ρV0(R)dt = E[dV0(R)], 
where ρ is the risk-adjusted rate of return.  Denoting V0’(R)=dV0/dR and 
V0”(R)=d2V0/dR2, the stochastic movement of dV0(R) is expanded by Ito’s Lemma as in 
equation (A.8).  Noting that ∂V0(R)/∂ t = 0, we get 
(A.19)  dV0(R) = [V0’(R)αR + ½ V0”(R)σ2R2]dt + V0’(R) σR dz. 
Taking expectation in both sides of equation (A.19) and noting E(dz) = 0 from (A.1), we 
have 
(A.20)   E[dV0(R)] = α R V0’(R) dt + ½ σ2R2 V0”(R)dt. 
Substituting equation (A.18) with equation (A.20) and dividing by dt, we get 
(A.21)   ½ σ2R2V0”(R) + (ρ - δ) R V0’(R) - ρV0(R) = 0, 
where δ is the rate of return shortfall defined as the difference between the risk adjusted 
rate and the drift rate (δ = ρ - α).  In equation (A.21), the second-order homogeneous 
differential equation is linear in the dependent variable V0 and its derivatives and thus its 
general solution can be expressed as a linear combination of any two independent 
solutions.  If we try the function V0(R) = AVβ, the following quadratic equation is 
obtained from equation (A.21).   
(A.22)   ½ σ2β(β - 1) + (ρ - δ)β - ρ = 0, 
where β is a root of the quadratic equation and the two roots are 
(A.23)   
2
1 2 2 2
1 ( ) ( ) 1 2 1
2 2
ρ δ ρ δ ρβ
σ σ σ
− − 
= − + − + >  
, 
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(A.24)   
2
2 2 2 2
1 ( ) ( ) 1 2 0
2 2
ρ δ ρ δ ρβ
σ σ σ
− − 
= − − − + <  
, 
so the general solution to equation (A.21) can be written as  
(A.25)   1 20 1 2( )V R A R A Rβ β= +  
The explanation of each term is given in equation (2.5) of chapter II. 
Similarly, the value of the active farm can be calculated from the addition of net 
cash flow (R-C)dt, where C is the variable cost.  In this case, we have the equation as in 
(A.18) 
(A.26)   ρV1(R)dt = E[dV1(R)] + (R - C)dt, 
Following the same procedures as the inactive farm, we have 
(A.27)  ½ σ2R2V1”(R) + (ρ - δ) RV1’(R) - ρV1(R) + R – C = 0. 
The form of the solution in equation (A.27) is 
(A.28)   1 21 1 2( )
R CV R B R B R
r
β β
δ= + + −  
Also the explanation of equation (A.28) is given in chapter II. 
Now suppose the entry threshold is RH and the exit threshold RL.  These satisfy 
the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions.  Equation (A.29) and equation 
(A.30) are value-matching conditions that require the value of waiting to equal the value 
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of investing at the entry and exit thresholds.  Equation (A.31) and equation (A.32) are 
smooth-pasting conditions that require the same slopes of the value of waiting and the 
value of investing at each threshold level.  However, in a perspective of the upper and 
lower reflecting barriers caused by a competitive equilibrium, those conditions can be 
interpreted as the results of the arbitrage among inactive farmers and active farmers, 
respectively. 
(A.29)   V0(RH) = V1(RH) – I, 
(A.30)   V1(RL) = V0(RL) – E, 
(A.31)   V0’(RH) = V1’(RH), 
(A.32)   V1’(RL) = V0’(RL). 
By substituting the equation (A.25) and (A.28) into value matching and smooth pasting 
conditions in equation (A.29) through (A.32), we have a simultaneous equation system 
as in chapter II.   
(A.33)   1 21 1 2 2( ) ( ) HH H
R CB A R B A R I
r
β β
δ− + − + − =  
(A.34)   1 21 11 1 1 2 2 2
1( ) ( ) 0H HB A R B A Rβ ββ β δ
− −
− + − + =  
(A.35)   1 21 1 2 2( ) ( ) LL L
R CB A R B A R E
r
β β
δ− + − + − = −  
(A.36)   1 21 11 1 1 2 2 2
1( ) ( ) 0H HB A R B A Rβ ββ β δ
− −
− + − + = . 
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In the model, the optimal entry and exit thresholds are equilibrium revenue levels 
with upper and lower reflecting barriers, respectively, which result in zero option value 
of waiting for inactive farmers (A1=A2=0). 
 
A.2. Entry and Exit Decisions with Real Options and Standard NPV in a  
        Competitive Industry 
In this section, intuitive explanations of the entry and exit decisions between the 
real option approach and standard NPV approach in a competitive industry used in 
chapter II are presented.   
 
 
A.2.1. Entry Decision  
 
First, examine the entry decision using both standard NPV and the real option 
approach in a competitive industry.  In a competitive industry, the option value of 
waiting V0(R) is zero because no abnormal project value can be expected.  If a positive 
project value exists, many farmers enter the business and the positive project value 
disappears while, in earlier stage of investment, the participant can enjoy a positive 
project value temporarily.  In aggregate level, many participants shift a market supply 
curve to the right so that the market price and farmer revenue decrease.  That is, the 
marginal benefit from additional investment decreases until the equilibrium is obtained 
in a competitive industry.  Thus, to invest in farming, a sufficient level of price or 
revenue is required.  A real option approach captures this marginal effect caused by price 
or revenue change in the industry level.  However, standard NPV approach cannot 
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consider this effect because standard NPV analysis can only be conducted in the 
assumption of constant marginal benefit from an additional investment.  
Now, consider a graph to compare the entry thresholds in both approaches, where 
V1(R) is the value of an active (current) farm, V0(R) is the value of an inactive (potential) 
farm, I is the sunk cost, and R is the revenue. 
 
 
 
    Project value (V) 
                             The value of an inactive                                                  
                              farm [V0(R) ≡ 0]   
           0                                    R0                        R1                        Revenue flow (R) 
                                                                                                                                     
                                                       The value of an active farm [V1(R) – I] 
 
 
                                            
     Investment cost 
                       (- I)  
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1. Entry thresholds under real options and NPV approach 
 
 
 
In the figure A.1, the R0 and R1 are the entry thresholds with standard NPV and 
the real option approaches, respectively, and V1(R) – I is the value of an active farm net 
of investment cost (sunk cost) that is bounded by zero project value caused by 
competition.  The value of an active farm increases with revenue at a decreasing rate 
because it captures the decreasing marginal benefit from investment.  Thus the 
difference between the two points, R0 and R1, is not caused by the option value of 
waiting but by the decreasing marginal benefit from investment under the real options 
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and a constant marginal benefit from investment under standard NPV in a competitive 
industry.  The entry threshold with the real options is greater than standard NPV 
approach because the entry decision with real option is affected by the competition in an 
industry level. 
 
 
A.2.2. Exit Decision 
 
Now we examine the exit thresholds in both approaches, standard NPV and the 
real options.  Once the farmer joins the farming, he only considers the variable cost, not 
the investment (sunk) cost.  Still the marginal benefit is a decreasing function of revenue 
in the real option approach while constant in standard NPV approach.  The variable cost 
is usually less than the investment cost, so we shift up the value function V1(R) to the 
upper side relative to the value function in the figure A.1. 
 
 
 Project value (V)                                                       
 
                              The value of an inactive                                                  
                              farm [V0(R) ≡ 0] 
            0               R0   R1                                                                   Revenue flow (R) 
                                                
                                        The value of an active farm [V1(R) – I] 
            
 Variable cost (–C) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2. Exit thresholds under real options and NPV approach 
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In the figure A.2, the R0 and R1 are the exit thresholds with the real option and 
standard NPV approaches, respectively, C is the variable cost, V1(R) – C is the value of 
an active farm net of the variable cost and V0(R) is the value of an inactive farm.  We 
ignore the salvage value and exit cost for convenience.  However, those values can be 
included in the value function if needed.   
The exit threshold with the real options is usually less than standard NPV 
approach because it captures the effect of the competition in an industry level.  That is, 
at the low level of revenue, all farmers in the industry expect the same choices for exit 
decision that result in the revenue floor.  Thus an active farmer requires a sufficiently 
low exit threshold that can be captured by the value function of an active farm. 
 
A.3. Parameters 
Several parameters are needed in the real option approach, such as a drift rate, a 
volatility rate, a risk free rate, a risk-adjusted rate, a correlation coefficient, a rate of 
return shortfall, an investment (sunk) cost, a variable cost, a salvage value, and an exit 
cost.  Among these parameters, a drift rate, a volatility rate, and a correlation coefficient 
are calculated from the logarithm of data because the real option approach in this study 
assumes the geometric Brownian motion of the stochastic process.   
Here only the parameters with logarithm are briefly mentioned because other 
parameters are explained in section 2.4 of the text.  An estimated drift rate can be 
obtained by regressing the log difference of each random variable, such as price and 
yield, on a constant, respectively.  A volatility rate is the standard deviation from the log 
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difference of each random variable.  A correlation coefficient is needed only when two 
random variables are involved. 
 
A.4. Data Used in Real Option Study 
 
Table A.1. Price and Yield for Table Grapes 
 
Year Price ($/ton) Yield (ton/acre) 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
435 
363 
449 
429 
438 
356 
574 
515 
523 
650 
448 
499 
552 
565 
610 
618 
6.44 
9.02 
7.81 
8.27 
8.21 
8.34 
8.12 
7.74 
9.21 
7.89 
10.19 
8.75 
8.71 
8.7 
8.1 
8.4 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
501.5 
89.26 
8.4 
0.80 
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service. 
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Table A.2. Operating Costs for the First 3 Years in Table Grape Productiona 
Cost per Acre ($) Item 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
Planting Costs 
   Land preparation – Subsoil 2X 
   Land preparation – Disc 2X 
   Land preparation – Level 
   Land preparation – Fumigate 2X 
   Survey & layout vineyard 
    Plant vines: 454 per acre 
    Install trellis system 
 
Cultural Costs 
    Prune & Tie – Dormant 
    Brush disposal 
    Fertilize 
    Irrigate 
    Pest control – Vertebrates 
    Disease control – Phomopsis 
    Training (Sucker, tie & train) 
    Weed control – Disc middle 
    Weed control – Mow middle 
    Weed control – Hand hoe 
    Pest control  
    Disease control – Mildew – Wettable  
    Insect control – Leafhoppers 2X 
    Disease control – Mildew – SI 
    Disease control – Sulfur dust app 
    Weed control – Spot spray 
    Weed control –Winter strip spray 
    Miscellaneous costs 
    Pickup truck use 
 
Harvest Costs 
    Harvest – Contract 
 
Cash Overhead Costs 
    Office expense 
    Liability insurance 
    Property taxes 
    Property insurance 
    Investment repairs 
 
Revenue 
2,432 
250 
50 
80 
550 
140 
1,362 
 
 
246 
 
 
 
85 
25 
 
 
7 
6 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
50 
36 
 
- 
 
 
161 
38 
4 
55 
39 
25 
 
- 
2,142 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
2,078 
 
560 
47 
 
8 
142 
10 
 
193 
7 
13 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
50 
36 
 
- 
 
 
163 
38 
4 
56 
40 
25 
 
- 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
762 
101 
9 
16 
209 
10 
39 
80 
7 
13 
 
22 
9 
29 
59 
20 
22 
31 
50 
36 
 
270 
270 
 
165 
38 
4 
57 
41 
25 
 
-1,950 
Total 2,839 2,865 -753 
a
 Interest cost and capital recovery cost are eliminated.  
Source: University of California-Cooperative Extension. 
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Table A.3. Operating Costs in Table Grape after the Third Year of Productiona 
Item Cost per Acre ($) 
Cultural Costs 
    Prune vines 
    Brush disposal (Every middle) 
    Tie Vines 
    Disease control – Phomopsis 
    Insect control – Mealybug 
    Weed control – Winter strip 
    Weed control – Mow middles 4X 
    Irrigate 
    Disease control – Phomosis 
    Mildew control – Dust sulfur 12X 
    Remove trunk suckers 
    Canopy management – Shoot thin 
    Fertilize 
    Berry thin 2X 
    Fruit management 
    Berry size 2X 
    Girdling 
    Weed control – Spot spray 
    Sulfur application 12X 
    Pest control – Vertebrate pest 
    Miscellaneous costs 
    Pickup truck use 
 
Harvest Costs 
    Pick, pack & supervise 
    Box, spread, swamp & haul 
 
Post Harvest Costs 
    Precool, palletize & stor 
    Table grape commission 
    Quality control inspection 
 
Cash Overhead Costs 
    Office expense 
    Liability insurance 
    Sanitation service 
    Property taxes 
    Property insurance 
    Investment repairs 
2,100 
281 
10 
73 
41 
36 
27 
13 
243 
17 
35 
35 
150 
20 
121 
587 
168 
80 
22 
42 
10 
50 
37 
 
3,045 
1400 
1645 
 
317 
175 
84 
58 
 
214 
39 
4 
1 
85 
60 
25 
Total 5,676 
a
 Interest cost and capital recovery cost are eliminated.  
Source: University of California-Cooperative Extension. 
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Table A.4. Investment Costs in Table Grape 
Itema Cost per Acre ($) 
  Land 
  Drip Irrigation System 
  Buildings 
  Shop Tools 
  Fuel Tanks & Pump 
  Vineyard Establishment 
  Equipment 
4,696 
1,036 
150 
87 
52 
5,256 
645 
Total 11,921 
a
 Annual costs of depreciable items are assumed to be reinvested to maintain their 
capacity. 
Source: University of California-Cooperative Extension. 
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B.1. Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming Model (MINLP) 
 
The general Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) for expected utility 
of income maximization objective function (B.1) and constraints (B.2) and (B.3) can be 
expressed as follows: 
(B.1)   [ ( )]kkMax E u pi  
(B.2) ( , , , ) 0f h z bν ≤  
(B.3) { } { }0, 0,1,2,... , 0,1h zν ≥ = =  
kpi  : Income under state of nature k 
k  : State of nature index 
f  : A non-linear function 
ν  : A vector of continuous choice variables 
h  : A vector of integer choice variables 
z  : A vector of binary choice variables 
b  : Total resources available 
The constraint (B.2) represents a non-linear function incorporating technical relationship 
between variables and available resources.  Constraint (B.3) represents non-negativity 
conditions for a vector of continuous choice variables, and a vector of integer variables 
and a vector of binary variables.  Specifically, the constraints can be expressed as 
follows: 
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(B.4) ( ) ,   kj j j kj j kj j j kj jR C rx I M LDP A F kpi− − + − + − = ∀   
j : Crop index 
A : Acreage in production (continuous variable) 
Rk : Revenue ($/acre) without programs under state of nature k ( * )k ky p  
C : Variable cost ($/acre)  
r : Input cost (nitrogen cost ($/lbs))   
x : Input level (nitrogen level (lbs/acre)) 
Ik : Indemnity ($/acre) under state of nature k 
M : Premium ($/acre) 
LDPk   : Loan deficiency payment under state of nature k ($/acre) 
F : Administration fee ($/crop) 
Constraint (B.4) represents an income balance equation, in which revenue, the indemnity, 
and the LDP show positive contributions, and variable costs, the premium, and the 
administration fee show negative contributions. 
(B.5)
( )
( )
|
,
, |
* * [( * ),0]
[ ( , )* * * * - * ,0]
0, ,
e
j CVG ij j kj i APH
CVG ijCVG i b h
j j CVG ij ij j kj kj i CRC
kj
p PEF Max CVG y y
Z
Max Max p p g CVG y p y
I k j
β
ββ
=
=
 
−
 
 + 
 
− = ∀
  
 
(B.6) 0k kj jk I EIω − = , j∀  
(B.7) [( ),0]* 0j kj kj kjMax MLR p y LDP− − = , ,k j∀  
i      : Insurance program index (APH and CRC) 
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CVG      : Yield coverage level (%) 
β        : CRC price election factor (95% and 100%) 
PEFCVG : APH price election factor by yield coverage level (integer variable) 
,CVGg β   : CRC price election factor by yield coverage level (binary variable) 
y   : APH yield guarantee (lbs/acre for APH and bu/acre for CRC) 
pk         : Price under state of nature k ($/lbs for APH and $/bu for CRC) 
yk         : Yield under state of nature k (lbs/acre for APH and bu/acre for CRC) 
ep  : Estimated (guaranteed) price for APH ($/lbs for APH and $/bu for CRC) 
bp  : Base price ($/lbs for APH and $/bu for CRC) 
hp  : Harvest price ($/lbs for APH and $/bu for CRC) 
MLR : Marketing loan rate ($/lb for APH and $/bu for CRC) 
,CVG iZ  : Yield coverage level by insurance program (binary variable) 
ωk   : Probability under state of nature k 
Equations (B.5) and (B.6) define the indemnity and the expected indemnity.  The per 
acre indemnity depends on the coverage level, price election factor, guaranteed price and 
yield, market price, and actual yield.  Equation (B.7) reports the LDP under marketing 
loan program.  
(B.8) 
( )
( )
|
,
, |
* * * *
* 0
* *
e
j CVG CVG CVG i APH
CVG ij jCVG i
CVG CVG CVG j i CRC
y p Bpr pr PEF
Z M
prm pr g
=
=
 
 
− =
 + 
 
  , j∀  
CVGBpr   : Base premium rate by yield coverage level 
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CVGpr     : Premium rate by yield coverage level (1- subsidy rate) 
CVGprm  : Premium by yield coverage level ($/acre) 
Equation (B.8) defines the per acre premium, which depends on the coverage level, price 
election factor, subsidy rate, guaranteed price and yield, market price, and actual yield.  
The base premium rate and premium calculation procedures are rather complicated.  The 
producer premium is the total premium minus the subsidy.   
(B.9) 
,
* 0CVG CVG ij jCVG i ADMF Z F− =  , j∀  
(B.10) jj A L≤  
CVGADMF   : Administration fee by yield coverage level ($/crop) 
L                : Total land available (acre) 
The administration fees in equation (B.9) vary by yield coverage level. The constraint 
(B.10) represents the land balance equation.  
(B.11) 
,
1CVG ijCVG i Z ≤  , j∀  
(B.12) 
, | 1CVG ij i CRCg ββ = = , ,CVG j∀  
(B.13) 
, , | , , |;
L U
CVG i CVG i i APH CVG i CVG i i APHPEF p PEF p= == = , CVG∀  
(B.14) 0A ≥ , { }0,1Z = , { }0,1g = , { }50,51,.....100PEF =  
L
CVGPEF   : Minimum price ( p ) election factor by yield coverage level in APH 
U
CVGPEF   : Maximum price ( p ) election factor by yield coverage level in APH 
Equation (B.11) requires that the sum of the binary values for yield coverage level across 
crop insurance programs should be less than or equal one so that no more than one yield 
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coverage level and one crop insurance program is selected for each crop.  Equation 
(B.12) represents that one of the price election factors between 95% and 100% should be 
chosen for each yield coverage level in CRC.  Equation (B.13) shows the lower and 
upper bound of price election factor by yield coverage level in APH.  Equation (B.14) 
represents the non-negativity of acreage allocation, the binary conditions of yield 
coverage level and the price election factor, and the set of price election factors available, 
respectively. 
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C.1. Comparative Static Results of the External Equity Financing with Crop 
Insurance 
 
(C.1) 
2*
2 2 2
1 2 1 1
1 2( ) (1 ) (1 )
p
a p
b α σ
δ α α σ δ δ
 +∂
= − ∂ + + − −  
 
2
2 2
1 21 { 1} 0(1 ) 1 2( )
p
a p
α σ
δ α α σ
 +
= − < 
− + +  
 
(C.2) 
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a p
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(C.8) 
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